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Part I: Introduction
Since the United States initiated its military response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001, law and respect for legal rights has remained a focal point of
legitimacy. No single issue, however, has dominated the legal debate. Instead, like
Republican candidates for the presidential nomination, different issues have risen to
discourse dominance, only to recede as other issues displaced them. Was the invasion
of Afghanistan justified? What was the status of captured Taliban and al Qaeda
operatives? What techniques were permissible to interrogate these detainees? Did the
detainees have a right to judicial review? Was the invasion of Iraq justified? Was the
response to detainee abuses in Iraq sufficient? What was the scope of the armed conflict
with al Qaeda, and who was included within the scope of that conflict? What were the
limits on the use of remotely piloted drones to attack alleged terrorist operatives?
Could that attack authority extend to U.S. citizens?
All of these issues have involved the complex intersection of national security
policy and domestic and international law, and many of them continue to vex policy
makers. However, almost like constancy of Mitt Romney, the one issue has maintained
consistent prominence throughout this period is the legality of long-term preventive
detention of alleged enemy belligerents. Indeed, the detention facility established at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was from inception and remains to this day a lightening rod of
legal controversy.
The most recent manifestation of this controversy came in the form of the longterm detention provisions of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. While much
ink has been spilt on the fundamental question of preventive detention of U.S. citizens
brought to the surface by these provisions, the procedural mandates included within
the provisions received less attention. Leaving aside the basic question of substantive
detention authority, the provision for a right to legal representation for individuals
subjected to detention is perhaps the most profound shift in detention policy since
September 11th. Since the inception of the U.S. preventive detention program, there has
been an ongoing effort to enhance the detention review process. Some of these
enhancements have been motivated by the Supreme Court’s detainee jurisprudence;
others most likely from the recognition that it is ultimately counter-productive to detain
individuals who may have been captured in a broad net but who in fact pose no
significant threat to the United States or coalition partners. Regardless of the
motivation, it is simply beyond dispute that the process utilized today to review the
detainability of captured personnel is far more protective than that originally adopted
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by the United States (which, to be fair, is in part the result of the bare minimalist
approach originally implemented by the Bush Administration).
One procedural protection has, however, been consistently absent from this
progression: provision of legal representation for the detainee review process.
Ostensibly based on an analogy to the tribunal provided to individuals contesting their
designation as prisoners of war (the so called ‘Article 5 Tribunal’), detainees are instead
provided with a lay military officer to serve as their personal representative. In
contrast, since the Secretary of Defense first ordered the creation of the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal in 2004 to review the status of Guantanamo detainees, the
government has always been represented by military attorneys, or JAG officers.
This lay-representation paradigm has finally been called into question. The
extremely controversial provisions of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
authorizing preventive military detention of U.S. and alien terrorist operatives includes,
for the first time, a mandate to provide detainees with legal representation during
detention review proceedings. The law, signed into law by President Obama on
December 19, 2011, provides in Section 1036 that the Secretary of Defense must submit
to Congress within 90 days of enactment a report “setting forth the procedures for
determining the status of persons captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) for purposes of section
1031.” The law then provides, inter alia, that “[A]n unprivileged enemy belligerent may,
at the election of the belligerent, be represented by military counsel at proceedings for
the determination of status of the belligerent.”

It is not yet clear at what point in the detention process this military counsel
requirement will become operative. According to the Conference Report on this
provision of the NDAA:
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1036) that would
require the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures for determining
the status of persons captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40), including
access to a military judge and a military lawyer for an enemy belligerent
who will be held in longterm detention. The House bill contained no
similar provision.
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The House recedes with an amendment clarifying that the Secretary of
Defense is not required to apply the procedures for long-term detention in
the case of a person for whom habeas corpus review is available in federal
court. Because this provision is prospective, the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to determine the extent, if any, to which such procedures will
be applied to detainees for whom status determinations have already been
made prior to the date of the enactment of this Act. The conferees expect
that the procedures issued by the Secretary of Defense will define
what constitutes ‘‘long-term’’ detention for the purposes of subsection (b).
The conferees understand that under current Department of Defense
practice in Afghanistan, a detainee goes before a Detention Review Board
for a status determination 60 days after capture, and again 6 months after
that. The Department of Defense has considered extending the period of
time before a second review is required. The conferees expect that the
procedures required by subsection (b) would not be triggered by the first
review, but could be triggered by the second review, in the discretion of
the Secretary.
Thus, legal representation will now turn on the definition of “long-term.” Nonetheless,
this is an important step forward in the procedural protections afforded individuals
subjected to wartime preventive detention; and, in the opinion of the authors, long
overdue. Whatever the ultimate triggering point definition that emerges, the detention
review process will undoubtedly be enhanced by this provision. While no amount of
process will ameliorate the concerns of critics of the fundamental concept of applying
wartime preventive detention to counter-terror operations, even the most ardent of such
critics must acknowledge that providing representatives trained in the lawyer ethos of
zealous representation is a marked improvement to the lay representation model
currently utilized.
This provision, and the fact that it has taken a decade to impose such a
representation requirement, calls into question the legitimacy of subjecting nontraditional captives to preventive detention without legal representation. Can a
detention review system that relies on lay military officers to represent the interests of
alleged belligerent operatives ever be considered legitimate? While it is clear that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is inapposite to
these non-criminal detention proceedings, it is the thesis of this article that the
underlying rationale of that jurisprudence indicates that the answer to this question is
no, and that the imposition of a legal representation requirement is long overdue.
4

The Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence has focused primarily on
U.S. criminal justice (although as noted the Court has also recently addressed the
significance of legal representation in the context of non-punitive detentions). However,
since September 11th the preventive detention of alleged terrorist operatives and other
unprivileged enemy belligerents in the context of what President Bush labeled the
Global War on Terror has become the most significant focal point in the debate over the
balance between government interests and individual liberty. Almost immediately after
the United States unleashed its military power to detect and disable the terrorist threat,
an entirely new preventive detention regime emerged: the detention of alleged
unprivileged belligerents captured in the ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda and
other associated forces. This detention regime has generated perhaps more controversy
than any other aspect of the ongoing struggle against the transnational terrorist threat,
triggering an abundance of legal scholarship, commentary, and debate. It has also
involved ongoing internal government efforts to refine the process for assessing which
captives should be subjected to what is essentially indefinite detention. These efforts
have been punctuated by judicial challenges and several critical Supreme Court
decisions, as well as legislative efforts to provide greater clarity in the balance between
government detention authority and individual interests. The net result has been both
an endorsement of the government’s invocation of armed conflict-based preventive
detention authority and imposition of limitations on the President’s authority to
manage the detention process.
All of this has resulted in two undeniable realities: first, the assertion of authority
based on the law of armed conflict to preventively detain captured terrorist belligerents
is now firmly entrenched and unlikely to be reconsidered any time soon; second, the
ever-growing recognition that this invocation will result in what Justice Kennedy
characterized as “generational detention” has and will continue to produce pressure on
the United States to ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of detention decisions. To this
end, the government has made substantial advances in the process for assessing when a
captured individual should be committed to indefinite military detention. These
advances have impacted not only the several hundred detainees in Guantanamo Bay
Cuba, but also the thousands of detainees held by the United States in Afghanistan.
These efforts to revise and improve the preventive detention process have
produced significant modifications intended to protect captives from erroneous
detention decisions. However, the lack of legal representation for detainees subject to
the detention review process has remained unaltered since the initiation of the Global
War on Terror. Relying ostensibly on a variety of justifications - including inter alia the
5

fact that not even lawful enemy combatants are afforded assistance of counsel to
challenge their preventive detention under the Geneva Conventions and that the
preventive nature of the detention in no way implicates the Sixth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution - the United States has steadfastly refused to provide captives such
assistance at proceedings to determine whether they qualify for indefinite detention.
Instead, in an obvious analogy to the process for determining POW status pursuant to
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Army
Regulation implementing that treaty, a non-legal representative is provided to assist the
captive in contesting the legitimacy of the unlawful belligerent status determination
and the preventive detention resulting from that characterization.
This article will question whether denying these captives legal representation is
justified in light of the interests at stake in the detention review process. In so doing, it
will consider the fundamental balance between the risks and consequences of error and
the feasibility of providing such assistance implicated by the preventive detention
process, and how this balance influences the ongoing conclusion that lay representation
by a military office is justified by the nature of the preventive detention process. While
acknowledging that wartime preventive detentions fall outside the scope of precedents
like Powell and Gideon, the article will draw from underlying principles reflected in
these decisions to question whether the lay representation by military officers is
sufficient to effectively advance the interests implicated in this non-punitive preventive
detention process. Finally, the article will consider the probable objections to providing
legal representation to detainees to include the feasibility of doing so.
The article will begin, in Part II, with a discussion of the ethos of zealous
representation and its significance in the U.S. legal culture. Part III of this article will
discuss the extension of traditional armed conflict based preventive detention to
terrorist operatives following the September 11th terrorist attacks. Part III will then trace
the evolution of detention procedures and the most recent efforts to improve the
detention review process in Afghanistan. Part IV will discuss the theoretical foundation
for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Part V will critically analyze the existing
personal representative concept, and suggest why this concept is insufficient to render
meaningful the procedural protections established to minimize the risk of erroneous
detention decisions. Part VI will consider the feasibility of providing legal
representation to individuals subject to indefinite detention as the result of being
classified as unprivileged belligerents, and consider the inevitable objections to such a
concept. Part VI will also consider how such representation may potentially impact
subsequent judicial review required pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
6

Boumediene v. Bush, as well as how it might contribute to limiting any extension of that
decision to other detention environments. The article will conclude by suggesting that
the balance of interests involved in the provision of legal representation should lead to a
careful reassessment of the logic of clinging to the current detention review
representation paradigm.
Part II: The Lawyer Ethos and Zealous Representation
In 1932, the Supreme Court decided Powell v. Alabama, a case that arose out of
one of the most disgraceful incidents in the sordid history of the Jim Crow era
segregation in the southern United States. Nine African-American men had been
summarily tried in an Alabama courtroom for the alleged rape of two Caucasian
women: Ruby Bates and Victoria Price. Unsurprisingly, all were convicted based only
on the testimony of the two alleged victims – testimony that would be seriously
discredited in subsequent proceedings. Defendant Powell was sentenced to death. The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, although one Justice
dissented as the result of what he recognized was a total failure to afford the defendants
due process of law.1

1

See Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 214–15 (Anderson, C.J., dissenting) (1932), rev’d, Powell v. Alabama, 287

U.S. 45 (1932). In his dissent, Chief Justice Anderson of the Alabama Supreme Court stated that the
ultimate guilt or innocence of the defendants was immaterial if they were not afforded the process they
were due at trial, and that the trial court should have ordered a new trial once public outrage had died
down to ensure that the defendants had received a fair trial:
Under the statute, the defendants being unable to employ counsel, it was the duty of the
trial judge to appoint counsel . . . The court did not name or designate particular counsel,
but appointed the entire Scottsboro bar, thus extending and enlarging the responsibility,
and, in a sense, enabling each one to rely upon others . . . [while] we can appreciate the
position of a lawyer appointed to defend an indigent defendant whom he may feel is
guilty and as against whom public sentiment is at fever heat, the record indicates that the
appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active and which is indicated by a
declination on the part of counsel to argue the case, notwithstanding the solicitor insisted
upon the right to open and close, and the state did, in fact, have the benefit of two
arguments and the defendants none. We, of course, realize that a defendant can
sometimes gain an advantage by agreeing to submit a case without argument, as the state
has the opening and closing, but, where there is no agreement and the solicitor or
prosecutor makes two arguments and the counsel for defendant makes none, it is bound
to make an unfavorable impression on the jury . . . As to whether or not these defendants
are guilty is not a question of first importance, the real one being, Did they get a fair and
impartial trial as contemplated by the bill of rights? . . . It may be that neither of the
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Powell
had been denied due process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Powell attacked the Alabama trial process on three grounds. First,
he argued that the summary nature of the process resulted in a denial of due process.
Second, he argued that the exclusion of members of his race from the jury violated due
process. Third, he argued that Alabama’s failure to provide meaningful assistance of
counsel violated due process.2
In an opinion read today by virtually every law student at the outset of their
study of federal criminal procedure, the Supreme Court struck down Powell’s
conviction.3 The Justices coalesced around a clear and compelling premise: the trial
without meaningful assistance of counsel fatally infected the proceedings and resulted
in a violation of Powell’s constitutional right to due process. This one flaw in the trial
process was of such magnitude that it rendered moot Powell’s alternate attacks, which

foregoing reasons [namely lack of zealous representation and consideration of the case
by a biased jury], if standing alone should reverse these cases, but, when considered in
connection with each other, they must collectively impress the judicial mind with the
conclusion that these defendants did not get that fair and impartial trial that is required
and contemplated by our Constitution. Therefore, in justice to the defendants and to the
fair name of the state of Alabama, as well as the county of Jackson, these cases should be
retried after some months of cooling time have elapsed and by their vigilant employed
counsel.
Id. Chief Justice Anderson went on to cite Alabama’s own precedent demanding fair trial in criticism of
the trial court’s actions, noting how the nature of a particular crime obviates neither the defendants’
rights nor the trial court’s mandate to ensure those rights are properly protected:
[T]he law should prevail, without any reference to the magnitude or brutality of the
offense charged. No matter how revolting the accusation, how clear the proof, or how
degraded, or even brutal, the offender, the Constitution, the law, the very genius of
Anglo-American liberty, demand a fair and impartial trial. If guilty, let him suffer such
penalty as an impartial jury, unawed by outside pressure, may under the law inflict upon
him. He is a human being and is entitled to this. Let not an outraged public, or one which
deems itself outraged, stain its own hands-stamp on its soul the sin of a great crime-on
the false plea that it is but the avenger of the innocent.
Id. at 215 (quoting Seay v. State, 93 So. 403, 405 (Ala. 1922)).
2

See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932).

3

See id. at 65.
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the Court did not even address. The implication was clear: even if Powell was correct
that the summary process and exclusion of African Americans from the jury violated
due process, denial of zealous representation of counsel produced a pervasive infection
to the entire process of such a magnitude that any other error would have been
superfluous. Nor had the general “assistance of the bar” come even close to protecting
Powell’s rights.4 Thus, the Supreme Court emphasized a simple yet compelling
premise: that a lawyer for the defense, devoted to the cause of the client and committed
to zealously represent that cause, is the true sine qua non of ensuring fundamental
fairness and a just outcome in the criminal adjudicatory process. Powell, however, was
limited to capital cases, a holding confirmed two decades later in Betts v. Brady.5
Three decades later the Court would once again address the relationship
between zealous legal representation and fair process. In Gideon v. Wainwright,
Petitioner Clarence Gideon challenged his conviction and incarceration resulting from a

4

The Supreme Court noted that while the trial court called for the local bar to assist the defendants, any

such assistance rendered fell short of the defendants’ constitutional right to legal representation:
[U]ntil the very morning of the trial no lawyer had been named or definitely designated
to represent the defendants. Prior to that time, the trial judge had ‘appointed all the
members of the bar’ for the limited ‘purpose of arraigning the defendants.’ Whether they
would represent the defendants thereafter, if no counsel appeared in their behalf, was a
matter of speculation only, or, as the judge indicated, of mere anticipation on the part of
the court. Such a designation, even if made for all purposes, would, in our opinion, have
fallen far short of meeting, in any proper sense, a requirement for the appointment of
counsel. How many lawyers were members of the bar does not appear; but, in the very
nature of things, whether many or few, they would not, thus collectively named, have
been given that clear appreciation of responsibility or impressed with that individual
sense of duty which should and naturally would accompany the appointment of a
selected member of the bar, specifically named and assigned.
Id. at 56.
5

316 U.S. 455, 464, 473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1973) (considering

whether “due process of law demands that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a state
must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant” and whether “the furnishing of counsel in all cases . . .
dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of fairness” and holding that the Sixth
Amendment possesses no “inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly
conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” The Supreme Court thus
declined to fully incorporate the Sixth Amendment against the States, preferring to allow each State to
legislate which situations guarantee a right to appointed counsel and which do not).
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trial at which his request for an appointed defense counsel had been denied based on
Florida law.6 Gideon had, of course, been afforded the right to secure his own attorney,
but when he informed the court that he was indigent and could not afford counsel, he
was told that he would have to defend himself against the District Attorney.7 However,
Gideon was not facing capital punishment, and as a result Powell’s holding did not
require Florida to appoint counsel for defendants like Gideon; at the time, Florida and
several other states did not provide indigent defendants with counsel in non-capital
criminal trials. Gideon’s petition was received by the Supreme Court in formas pauperas,
and the Court appointed Abe Fortas to advocate Gideon’s cause.8
The issue presented to the Court was more significant than the right to be
represented by counsel; it was whether the failure of the government to provide such
representation to indigent defendants fatally undermined the legitimacy of the criminal
adjudicatory process and thereby violated Gideon’s 14th Amendment right to due
process. During his argument before the Court, Fortas noted:
Without [counsel], how can a civilized nation pretend that it is having a
fair trial, under our adversary system, which means that counsel for the
State will do his best within the limits of fairness and honor and decency
to present the case for the State, and counsel for the defense will do his
best, similarly, to present the best case possible for the defendant, and
from that clash there will emerge the truth. That is our concept, and how
6

7

372 U.S. at 338.
The following exchange occurred at the trial court and was memorialized in the Supreme Court’s

opinion:
The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in
this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint
Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I
am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this
case.
The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented
by Counsel.
Id. at 336.
8

See Abe Krash, Architects of Gideon: Remembering Abe Fortas and Hugo Black, THE CHAMPION:
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http://www.nacdl.org/Champion/Articles/98mar02.htm (last visited November 30, 2011).
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available

at

can we say, how can it be suggested that a court is properly constituted,
that a trial is fair, unless those conditions exist.9

Gideon prevailed on his challenge, and the Court’s decision extended Powell’s logic to
any criminal defendant.10 Once again, the message was clear: the zealous legal
representation for an accused is essential to ensuring the fundamental fairness of
criminal process.

9

See Gideon v. Wainwright – Oral Argument, Part 1, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-

1969/1962/1962_155 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
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See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that counsel must be appointed in any case

resulting in a sentence of actual imprisonment unless the defendant knowingly and intelligently). The
Court declined to create different rules for felonies, misdemeanors, and petty offenses, noting that “[t]he
requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution,”
reasoning that
legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment
even for a brief period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six
months or more . . . We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with
misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the
accused a fair trial . . . Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when
the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure
of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer
to represent the accused before the trial starts.
Id. at 33, 36, 40. But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that counsel does not need to be
appointed if the defendant was convicted but not sentenced to any term of imprisonment). The Court,
noting a distinction between imprisonment as an authorized and threatened possible penalty and
imprisonment actually assessed as a penalty, concluded:
[T]he central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in
kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and warrants
adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to
appointment of counsel . . . We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal
defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the
right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.
Id. at 373–74.
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In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court held that the Gideon right to
counsel provided at government expense is triggered by any sentence that includes
even one day of incarceration.11 Rejecting a misdemeanor/felony dichotomy and
drawing a trigger point at the sentences to incarceration, and not at the nature of the
offense, indicated the Court’s recognition that it is the consequence of government
action, and not necessarily the label, that implicates this fundamental right.12 In another
line of decisions, the Court also held that even when a defendant is represented at trial,
failure of counsel to provide effective representation results in constitutional error.13 It
has therefore become axiomatic that zealous representation of counsel is an essential
component to the criminal adjudication process. Nor has the importance of counsel
been limited to the criminal incarceration context. In United States v. Salerno, the
Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention authority established by Congress in
the Bail Reform Act of 1984,14 relying in large measure on the Act’s provision for an
adversarial hearing in which the suspect is represented by counsel.15

11

See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
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Id.

13

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (holding that the fact that “a person who happens

to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to satisfy the constitutional
command.” Instead, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment “envisions counsel’s playing a role that is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results . . . An accused is entitled to be
assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the
trial is fair”). Strickland also set down the requirements for a successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. See generally id. at 689–96 (discussing the elements for a court to hold that counsel provided
ineffective assistance and thus effectively denied the defendant his constitutional right to counsel).
14

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (holding that “the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail

Reform Act of 1984 fall within th[e] carefully limited exception [of detention prior to trial or without
trial],” because the Act’s detention authority requires “[an] adversary hearing [showing that the accused]
. . . pose[s] a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can
dispel” and that the Act contains “numerous procedural safeguards . . . [which] must [be] attend[ed at]
this adversary hearing” before the accused can be detained).
15

See 18 U. S. C. § 3142(e), (f)(2) (allowing a judicial officer to order the detention of the accused before

trial if “no condition or combination of conditions [set out in § (c)] will reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community,” and further requiring a
hearing before making such determination. Section (f) provides the circumstances under which a hearing

12

Part I: Terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Preventive Detention
A.

Detention of Combatants and the Global War on Terror

Since the inception of what President Bush called the “Global War on Terror,” it
has become apparent that the United States considers the preventive detention of
captured enemy belligerents a fundamental incident of armed conflict authorized by
customary international law.16 This is a clear departure from the law of peace.17 While
U.S. jurisprudence has established several very limited situations in which preventive
detention is lawful outside the context of armed conflict,18 due process normally
requires prompt charge and trial to justify a deprivation of liberty outside the armed
conflict context.19 In the armed conflict context, however, preventive detention is an
must be held and the rights of the accused at that hearing; rights include “the right to be represented by
counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed.” Id. at §
(f)(2)).
16

See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.D.C. 2009), abrogated by Uthman v. Obama, 637

F.3d 400 D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (hereinafter
“AUMF”) authorized the President of the United States to detain members of the non-national
organizations named in the AUMF).
17

See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6

U.S.T. 3316, 75 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities”) (hereinafter “GPW”).
18

See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (holding that the individual’s strong interest in and right to liberty

“may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the
greater needs of society,” but also expressing that the extensive safeguards for the accused built in to the
Bail Reform Act and the hearing requirement prior to detention were sufficient to defend the Act against
a facial challenge to constitutionality).
19

See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that post-indictment, pretrial preventive

detention under the Bail Reform Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause nor the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that “a
citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions
before a neutral decisionmaker”).
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action justified by the principle of military necessity, a customary international law
norm that permits belligerents to take all measures not otherwise prohibited by
international law necessary to bring about the prompt submission of an opponent.20
Depriving captured enemy belligerents the opportunity to return to hostilities
is certainly necessary to defeat an enemy.21 Nonetheless, there is contemporary debate
related to whether preventative detention authority is the same in both international
and non-international armed conflicts. Several treaties, including most importantly, the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW)22 (which
regulates the treatment of certain categories of detained combatants and civilians acting
on behalf of enemy States in an international armed conflict) are clearly founded upon
an international consensus that States have the legal authority to detain such
individuals. However, neither customary nor treaty law involving the LOAC provide
clear authority related to the detention of enemy belligerents in the context of noninternational armed conflicts. As a result, some experts assert that domestic statutory
authority is required to legally justify preventive detention in this context, even while
conceding such detention is consistent with the principle of military necessity.23
20

See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 3 (July 1956)

(hereinafter “FM 27-10”).
21

See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 279 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated by Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129

S.Ct. 1545 (2009) (holding that while Congress may have given the President the authority to detain
petitioner as an enemy combatant, petitioner had been given insufficient process to challenge his
detention).
22

23

See generally GPW, supra note 17.
See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2010). Petitioners’ argument rejected the

government’s status-based detention scheme as well as its authority to preventatively detain in a NIAC:
[Petitioners insist] that detention based solely on membership in an organization such as
al Qaeda is completely antithetical to the law of war. Such an approach is prohibited by
the law of war, the argument goes, because it represents detention based on status rather
than conduct, which is impermissible in the context of the current non-international
armed conflict. Petitioners also contend that status-based detentions ignore the
distinction between combatants and civilians in traditional international armed conflicts.
In their view, that distinction – which is fundamental to the law of war – leads to the
conclusion that the only persons who are detainable in the current armed conflict are
“individuals who were lawful combatants under Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions
(members of an armed force of a State or other militia as described in Article 4), and
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Pursuant to this legal interpretation, preventive detention of a non-state belligerent
absent such domestic statutory authority is inherently arbitrary.24
civilians who become unlawful combatants by reason of their direct participation in
hostilities as that standard is understood in international law.” As a practical matter,
then, the only individuals who would be detainable under petitioners’ framework are
civilians who directly participate in hostilities (i.e., individuals who would be detainable
based upon their conduct, not their status), because by definition no “lawful combatants”
fight on behalf of the enemy in the current non-international armed conflict.
Id. at 70–71 (citations omitted). While the D.C. Circuit rejected several of these claims (citing the Geneva
Conventions), it did state that the line beyond which the government could not detain legally under
either international law or the AUMF was demarcated by the difference between membership in
associated forces and providing “substantial support” to those forces:
In addition to members of al Qaeda and the Taliban, the government's detention
authority also reaches those who were members of ‘associated forces.’ For purposes of
these habeas proceedings, the Court interprets the term ‘associated forces’ to mean ‘cobelligerents’ as that term is understood under the law of war . . . [However,] [d]etaining
an individual who ‘substantially supports’ such an organization, but is not part of it, is
simply not authorized by the AUMF itself or by the law of war. Hence, the government’s
reliance on ‘substantial support’ as a basis for detention independent of membership in
the Taliban, al Qaeda or an associated force is rejected.
Id. at 74–76.
24

See generally Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military

Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1084–87 (2008) (discussing the Geneva Convention criteria
applicable to finding that a detainee deserves POW treatment, and asserting that while the “laws of war
also provide for military detention or preventive internment during non-international armed conflicts
(NIACs),” there are no explicit detention criteria for NIACs (as opposed to those for IACs), and the only
bright-line rule applicable to NIAC detainees appears in Common Article 3, and in certain articles of the
First and Second Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions; however, the United States is not a
party to the Additional Protocols so any authority thereby would be customary international law or nonbinding (the position of the United States government). See also Jody M. Prescott, Detention Status Review
Process in Transnational Armed Conflict: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Parwan Detention Facility, 5 U. MASS.
ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 5, 25–26 (2010). Prescott describes the U.S. policy decision to apply a domestic
military regulation, AR 190-8 to all detainees regardless of the type of conflict they were captured in, and
considers the concern that even this step, which grants protections to so-called unlawful enemy
combatants, still falls short of the humanitarian baseline encouraged by some critics of U.S. detention
policy:
For detainees held in non-international armed conflicts, Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions sets the baseline for physical treatment but does not specify how
detainee status should be determined or reviewed. As a matter of implementing U.S.
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The United States follows a different interpretation of the law, relying on the
customary LOAC principle of military necessity to justify the detention of enemy
belligerents in any armed conflict, even absent a treaty or statute expressly authorizing
preventive detention.25 This legal basis for the entire unprivileged belligerent detention
regime is based on a seminal World War II era Supreme Court precedent – the principal
authority relied on by the Supreme Court when it endorsed the President Bush’s
invocation of preventive detention authority to incapacitate captured al Qaeda and
Taliban personnel.26
B.

The U.S.
Belligerents

Legal

Foundation

for

Preventive

Detention

of

Enemy

The 1942 Supreme Court decision Ex parte Quirin27 reviewed the legality of the
trial by secret military commission of nine German saboteurs. The defendants had been
arrested by the FBI after landing on Long Island and Florida, and dispersing to cities in

policy, the decision to apply AR 190-8 to all detainees regardless of the nature of the
conflict provides for an expansion in the humanitarian treatment afforded by Common
Article 3. Practically, this is consistent with the aim of the theory of transnational armed
conflict, but some might argue that this expands the scope of armed conflict beyond what
international humanitarian treaty law, and possibly customary law, allows. Accordingly,
some might argue that the process afforded under AR 190-8, although greater than that
expected under international law in cases of international armed conflict, is not sufficient
from an international human rights law perspective for the detention of individuals who
are believed to be a part of al Qaeda.
Id. (citations omitted).
25

Francis Lieber defined military necessity as “those measures which are indispensible for securing the

ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.” U.S. War
Department, General Order No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863). More recently, the United States has defined military
necessity as “that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.” FM 27-10, supra
note 3, at para. 3(a).
26

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

27

317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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the United States.28 Selected by the German intelligence service because of their
proficiency in English and U.S. dialects, the defendants were all members of the
German armed forces trained to conduct sabotage missions.29 After coming ashore from
a German U-Boat, they immediately discarded their uniforms and proceeded to various
locations within the United States ostensibly to execute their sabotage missions.30
All of the saboteurs were quickly apprehended by the FBI.31 Although the
Department of Justice began the process to bring them to trial in federal court, President
Roosevelt chose instead to order trial by a secret military commission on war crimes.32
The commission was convened by order of the President, and the saboteurs were all
charged with violations of the laws and customs of war, including espionage and
operating as unlawful belligerents.33
The German defendants challenged the legality of trial by military commission
by writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court.34 In a per curium opinion, the Court
28

See id. at 21.

29

See id.

30

See id.

31

See id.

32

See id. at 22–23. Roosevelt ordered trial by military commission because he “feared that [the saboteurs]

would not be punished severely enough in an Article III court.” Carlissa Carson, Yes We Can Revise the
Current Military Commission System, But Why?, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 389, 399 (2010).
33

See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22–23.

34

See id. at 20. The German defendants argued
that the President is without any statutory or constitutional authority to order
the petitioners to be tried by military tribunal for offenses with which they are
charged; that in consequence they are entitled to be tried in the civil courts with
the safeguards, including trial by jury, which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
guarantee to all persons charged in such courts with criminal offenses. In any
case it is urged that the President's Order, in prescribing the procedure of the
Commission and the method for review of its findings and sentence, and the
proceedings of the Commission under the Order, conflict with Articles of War
adopted by Congress . . . and are illegal and void.

17

denied the writ and held that the military commission had lawful jurisdiction to try the
saboteurs.35 The Court held that, as enemy belligerents, the defendants were subject to
the laws and customs of war.36 More importantly, the invocation of this law was
justified by the state of war between Germany and the United States, providing the
source of authority for the capture, detention, and trial of the defendants.37
Although the Quirin decision focused primarily on the legality of trial by
military commission, it also addressed preventive detention authority. According to the
Court:
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful
populations of belligerent nations and also between those
who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful
combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners
of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition
they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals
for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.38

Id. at 24.
35

Id. at 24.

36

Id. at 37.

37

See id. at 31. The Court discussed unlawful belligerents, such as saboteurs, and discussed their rights

under the law of armed conflict in the following manner:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in
time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the
purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of
belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war,
but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals.
Id.
38

Id. at 30–31.
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The Supreme Court therefore did not consider statutory detention authority necessary
to justify the preventive detention of captured enemy belligerents, instead relying on
the customary law of war. Perhaps even more important for the events that transpired
after September 11, 2001, the Court clearly considered this authority applicable to
captured enemy belligerents irrespective of whether they qualified as ‘lawful’
combatants (captured enemy belligerent personnel qualified for status as prisoners of
war pursuant to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War).39
Soon after initiation of American military action against Taliban and al Qaida
forces in Afghanistan following the terror attacks of September 11th, the U.S. military
began detaining Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. Many captives were subsequently
transferred to the newly established Military Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base in Cuba. Military Order No. 1, issued by President Bush in November 2001,
included a directive to establish this facility for the detention of “unlawful alien enemy
combatants.”40 Accordingly, U.S. nationals were excluded from the category of captured
personnel subject to detention at Guantanamo; however, they were not excluded from
the broader scope of unlawful combatant detention. The United States soon learned that
one captive who had been transferred from Afghanistan to Guantanamo, Yaser Esam
Hamdi, had been born in the United States and was therefore a U.S. citizen. This
knowledge did not result in his release or transfer to civilian custody for purposes of
trial by federal court. Instead, his preventive detention continued, but only after he was
immediately transferred to a military confinement facility in the United States.
Hamdi’s father successfully petitioned the courts by writ of habeas corpus filed
as a “next friend” on behalf of his son. The challenge culminated with the Supreme
Court decision of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.41 Invoking Quirin, the Supreme Court endorsed
Hamdi’s continued preventive detention as an enemy belligerent.42 Although the Court

39

See infra pp. 17–20.

40

Military Order of November 13, 2001 – Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the

War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 3(a) (2001) (hereinafter “Military Order No. 1”).
41

542 U.S. 507 (2004).

42

Id. at 519, 520 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant”

. . . “[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid,
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also held that Hamdi was entitled to more meaningful procedural protections than had
been afforded by the Executive Branch, it rejected the assertion that Hamdi’s detention
was unlawful because he had not been captured in the context of a formally declared
war against a state enemy. Instead, because Hamdi had been captured in the context of
an armed conflict prosecuted by the President with the statutory support of Congress
(in the form of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against those
responsible for the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 or “AUMF”),43 and had been
engaged in hostilities against U.S. and Coalition forces, Hamdi was legally
indistinguishable from the defendants in Quirin.44 According to the Court:
In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the
AUMF does not use specific language of detention. Because
detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is
a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use
of “necessary and appropriate force,” Congress has clearly
and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow
circumstances considered here. 45
Earlier in the opinion, the Court emphasized that the “principles” and customs it
referenced in the extract quoted above were the principles derived from the law of war

guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning
of . . . the law of war”).
43

Authorization for Use of Military Force, P.L. 107-40 (S.J.Res. 23), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001). The

AUMF was a congressional mandate stating that
the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Id. at § 2(a).
44

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17 (“The threshold question before us is whether the Executive has the authority

to detain citizens who qualify as ‘enemy combatants’ . . . [we find that regardless of whether the President
could order detention without Congressional authority, in this situation] Congress has in fact authorized
Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF”).
45

Id. at 519.
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permitting the preventive detention of captured enemy personnel.46 These principles,
according to the Court, were implicitly invoked by Congress when it authorized the
President to use all “necessary and appropriate” force against “nations, organizations,
or persons associated with the September 11th terrorist attacks.”47 In short, the AUMF
authorized the President to invoke the same principle of military necessity that had
been central to the Quirin Court’s endorsement of preventive detention of the German
saboteurs in 1942.
The Hamdi opinion laid a legal foundation that continues to be built upon today.
By extending the Quirin holding to the armed conflict against individuals,
organizations, and nations associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the
Court endorsed the application of the armed conflict legal framework to the struggle
against transnational terrorism.48 However, by condemning the summary process relied
upon by the Executive Branch to determine that Hamdi fell into the category of
detainable enemy belligerent, the Court also set in motion a procedural revision process
that continues to this day.49 Thus, the preventive detention of terrorists pursuant to the
law of armed conflict involves two distinct legal questions. First, from a substantive
perspective, who falls within the scope of this preventive detention authority? Second,
to what process are individuals alleged to fall within that scope entitled?
a. The Substantive Foundation
As significant as Hamdi’s extension of the Quirin precedent was to the “war on
terror,”50 the Court addressed only what it characterized as the narrow question of
46

Id.

47

See id. at 518.

48

See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

(2009).
49

See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT M. CHESNEY, & RABEA BENHALIM, THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION:

THE

GUANTÁNAMO

HABEAS

CASES

AS

LAWMAKING

74

(2010),

available

at

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guanta
namo_wittes_chesney.pdf (“[W]hile the detainees are asking the Court of Appeals to adopt a stricter
standard of proof, the government is asking it to force the lower court judges to lighten up”).
50

The authors use this term to generally define the operations against al Qaeda and Taliban operatives

occurring primarily in Afghanistan, with the recognition that some operations occur in other countries or
parts of the world.
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whether a U.S. citizen falling into an accepted core definition of enemy combatant could
be preventively detained:
The threshold question before us is whether the Executive
has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as “enemy
combatants.” There is some debate as to the proper scope of
this term, and the Government has never provided any court
with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as
such. It has made clear, however, that, for purposes of this
case, the “enemy combatant” that it is seeking to detain is an
individual who, it alleges, was “part of or supporting forces
hostile to the United States or coalition partners” in
Afghanistan and who “engaged in an armed conflict against
the United States” there. We therefore answer only the
narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens
falling within that definition is authorized.51
Concluding Hamdi’s detention did not violate substantive due process was accordingly
unremarkable. Instead, it was based on the narrow underlying conclusion that
preventive detention of an enemy combatant in an armed conflict is legally authorized,
even if, as in the case of Hamdi, the combatant is a U.S. citizen.52 (This conclusion
perforce means that such authority exists with respect to alien enemy combatants, given
that aliens enjoy no more constitutional protections than U.S. citizens). This conclusion
is based on a law of armed conflict axiom: the authority of States to kill enemy
combatants implies the authority of States to detain them to prevent their return to
hostilities:53

51

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.

52

See id. at 532–33.

53

The Court previously ruled on a similar issue: whether a State governor could order his National Guard

contingent to detain State citizens participating in an insurrection or preventing the National Guard from
restoring the peace. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909). In Moyer, the respondent deployed the
Colorado National Guard to quash what he considered to be an “insurrection” pursuant to his powers
under the Constitution of Colorado. Petitioner, alleged to be a leader or active participant of the
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We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category
we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which
they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as
to be an exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has
authorized the President to use.54
The Hamdi opinion therefore explicitly validated the legality of preventive detention of
enemy combatants; however, it did not provide a comprehensive definition of the term
“enemy combatant.” Instead, the Court expressly left the definitional process to the
lower courts, noting, “[t]he legal category of enemy combatant has not been elaborated
upon in great detail. The permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the

insurrection, was detained for two and a half months but suit was never filed against him. In ruling in
favor of the respondent (and in favor of the detention), the Supreme Court stated:
The [Colorado] Constitution is supplemented by an act providing that ‘when an invasion
of or insurrection in the state is made or threatened, the governor shall order the national
guard to repel or suppress the same’ . . . That means that he shall make the ordinary use
of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he
may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in
the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by
way of precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are
made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the
insurrection off, the governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after
he is out of office, on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief . . .
When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a matter involving its life, the
ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the
moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial
process.
Id. at 84–85. Although the case involves a State’s power to deal with intrastate security issues, there are
obvious parallels to the more recent federal jurisprudence regarding detainment.
54

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. Additionally the Court noted the “clearly established principle of the law of war

that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.” See id. at 520 (citing GPW, supra note 17, art. 118)
(“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities”)). As pointed out in Hamdi and other cases involving detaining belligerents during the
ongoing Global War on Terror, it is currently impossible to determine what event(s) would demarcate the
end of active hostilities for a war fought across the globe against transnational, non-state actors.

23

lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to them.”55 Subsequent U.S. practice,
judicial decisions, and congressional action in this field all exposed how laced with
ambiguity this term is in the context of counter-terror operations.
The Hamdi Court apparently expected greater clarity would result from decisions
related to subsequent habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees. However,
Congress quickly responded to Hamdi (and the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v.
Bush that the federal habeas statute, 18 U.S.C. 2241, applied to detainees in
Guantanamo)56 by restricting the access of Guantanamo detainees to habeas corpus
review. These restrictions were set forth in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which
inter alia amended the habeas statute to effectively reverse the decision in Rasul and
instead provide for an alternative form of review by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.57
Then, in response to the Supreme Court’s determination in its 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
decision, which held that the DTA did not apply retroactively (this permitting statutory
habeas challenges to go forward so long as they were pending at the time Congress

55

56

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Supreme Court, in considering whether detainees at

Guantanamo could seek relief under the federal habeas statute, noted the historical applications of the
writ of habeas corpus and determined that if the issuing court had jurisdiction to issue the writ, then it
had the power to do so:
Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at [Guantanamo] is consistent with
the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At common law, courts exercised habeas
jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as
well as the claims of persons detained in the so-called “exempt jurisdictions,” where
ordinary writs did not run, and all other dominions under the sovereign’s control . . . In
the end, the answer to the question presented is clear. Petitioners contend that they are
being held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the United States. No party
questions the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians. Section 2241, by its
terms, requires nothing more. We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court
jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention
at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
Id. at 481–81, 483 (citations omitted).
57

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title X; Pub. L. No. 109-163, Title XIV (hereinafter

“DTA”).
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passed the DTA),58 Congress enacted the Military Commission Act (MCA) of 2006,59
which, inter alia, amended the statute so that it was clear that the restrictions imposed
on statutory habeas access by the DTA applied both prospectively and retrospectively.
The foregoing series of judicial decisions and countermanding statutory
amendments set the stage for Boumediene v. Bush.60 Boumediene involved the questions of
1) whether non-resident aliens detained outside the territory of the United States at the
Guantanamo detention facility were entitled to the constitutional privilege of habeas
corpus; and, 2) if so, whether the DTA as amended by the MCA provided an adequate
substitute for that privilege.61 Writing for a five justice majority, Justice Kennedy held
that the unique situation of these detainees – detained by the federal government, in an
area outside the territorial sovereignty of the United States but subject to the exclusive
control of the United States,62 with no viable alternative access to challenge the legality
58

548 U.S. 557 (2006). The Government’s first challenge to the federal courts exerting habeas jurisdiction

over Guantanamo detainees was based on an argument that the DTA applied retroactively to cases
pending at the time of the statute’s enactment. See id. at 574–75. The Court analyzed other provisions of
the DTA and found language which applied the DTA to pending cases; however this language was
absent from the jurisdiction-stripping provisions. Id. at 578–79. The Court rejected the retroactivelyapplied jurisdiction-stripping argument, holding that “a negative inference may be drawn from the
exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other provisions of the same
statute” and determining that “Congress’ [sic] rejection of the very language that would have achieved
the result the Government urges here weighs heavily against the Government’s interpretation.” Id. at
579–80.
59

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (hereinafter “MCA”).

60

553 U.S. 723 (2008).

61

See id. at 732–33. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall

not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”). The
Constitution does not actually grant any right to habeas corpus; the Suspension Clause merely states the
situations under which Congress may suspend the writ. Thus, in American law, the right to habeas relief
both predates the Constitution of the United States and should be assumed to be available unless
Congress has enacted legislation under the Suspension Clause to strip away rights to access the writ.
62

Contra Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69 (discussing how Johnson v. Eisentrager declined to extend full

constitutional protections to territories temporarily controlled by the United States (such as the territories
temporarily occupied and administered by the United States following the German surrender in 1945)
but asserting that “Guantanamo Bay . . . is no transient possession. In every practical sense Guantanamo
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of their detention; facing a genuine prospect of generational deprivation of liberty, and
far removed from the battlefield point of capture63 – required extension of constitutional
habeas access to allow them to challenge their detention.64 Furthermore, the Court
concluded that review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
authorized by the DTA and MCA, was an inadequate substitute for habeas review by a
court, as required by the U.S. Constitution.65
As a result of this decision, the process anticipated by Justice O’Connor in her
Hamdi opinion, by which lower courts would add the proverbial “flesh to the bones” of
the term “enemy combatant” finally began in earnest. Since the Boumediene decision, the
federal courts in the District of Columbia Circuit have entertained numerous habeas
petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees challenging the legality of their continued
is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United States”) (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 480 (2004) (“By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises ‘complete
jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control
permanently if it so chooses”) (citations omitted)). In his Rasul concurrence, Justice Kennedy also
emphasizes this point:
Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory, and it is one far
removed from any hostilities . . . In a formal sense, the United States leases the Bay; the
1903 lease agreement states that Cuba retains “ultimate sovereignty” over it . . . At the
same time, this lease is no ordinary lease. Its term is indefinite and at the discretion of the
United States. What matters is the unchallenged and indefinite control that the United
States has long exercised over Guantanamo Bay. From a practical perspective, the
indefinite lease of Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United
States, extending the “implied protection” of the United States to it.
Rasul, 527 U.S. at 487 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777–78 (1950)) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
63

See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 729 (discussing a concern in the CSRT process and identifying that “the

consequence of error [in a CSRT tribunal] may be detention for the duration of hostilities that may last a
generation or more”).
64

See id. at 770–71, 797 (noting that “[s]ome of these petitioners have been in custody for six years with no

definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention” and, as a result, determining that
“[t]heir access to the writ is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they
do not obtain the relief they seek”).
65

See id. at 791–92.
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detention. Many of these challenges have required the courts to engage in the process of
determining, first, how to define “enemy combatant” and second, which petitioners
have been properly designated by the government as enemy combatants subject to
lawful preventive detention.66
The contours of the definition that is gradually emerging from this litigation
process are sketchy at best. As a result, it is useful to conceptualize the LOAC
preventive detention authority for terrorist operatives through the following analytical
model. First, as the courts have recognized that the AUMF is the basis for the authority
to preventively detain in the present conflict, the courts have focused their analysis on
defining the groups that fall within the scope of the AUMF, i.e., the Taliban, al Qaeda,

66

Between 2004 and 2009, a total of 581 CSRTs were held; of those, 539 detainees were determined to be

properly classified as enemy combatants, 39 were found to no longer be classified as enemy combatants,
and 3 were placed in suspension. Dep’t of Defense, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary (Feb. 10,
2009), http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012). In those Administrative
Review Board records made public and held between 2006 and 2008, a total of approximately 707 ARBs
had been held by February 2008 and approximately 95 detainees were designated to be transferred. See
generally Dep’t of Defense, Administrative Review Board Summary: Round 2 Update (Apr. 25, 2006),
http://www.defense.gov/news/arb2.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (reporting that out of 330 detainees
eligible for an ARB review during the period of April 25, 2006 to February 20, 2007, 330 ARBs were held,
55 detainees were designated to transfer and 273 detainees were designated to continue detainment, with
2 decisions not yet finalized by the Designated Civilian Officer (DCO)); Dep’t of Defense, Administrative
Review Board Summary: Round 3 Update (Mar. 2008), http://www.defense.gov/news/arb3.pdf (last visited
Jan. 5, 2012) (reporting that out of 253 detainees eligible for an ARB review during the period of January
30,2007 to March 2008, 253 ARBs were held, 33 detainees were designated to transfer and 195 detainees
were designated to continue detainment, with 25 decisions not yet finalized by the DCO); Dep’t of
Defense,
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http://www.defense.gov/news/arb4.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (reporting that out of 164 detainees
eligible for an ARB review during the period of February 19, 2008 to February 2009, 124 ARBs were held,
7 detainees were designated to transfer and 92 detainees were designated to continue detainment, with 26
decisions not yet finalized by the DCO). As of January 2, 2011, 67 habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo
detainees have been considered by federal district courts in the D.C. Circuit. See Lyle Denniston,
Boumediene: The record so far, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/boumediene/ (Jan. 2,
2011), last visited January 3, 2012. Of 38 granted writs of habeas corpus, the United States did not appeal
29 and did appeal 9, of which 2 of those appealed by the United States were vacated or reversed. See id. at
Table 1. Of those 29 detainees whose writs were granted and not appealed, all but 5 detainees had been
transferred to other countries as of January 2011. Id.

For a discussion of the various detainability

definitions employed by the D.C. federal district courts and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, see infra n. 173.
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and associated forces.67 Second, in order to apply AUMF detention authority, the courts
have adopted a working definition of an “unlawful enemy belligerent” (the term
adopted by President Obama as a substitute for the original “unlawful enemy
combatant” used by President Bush),68 as more fully discussed below. Third, in
applying the authority and definition in individual cases, the reviewing courts have
sought to determine (i) whether the government, by a preponderance of the evidence,
has alleged conduct by the detainee that is sufficient to bring the detainee within the
definition of “unlawful enemy belligerent” and (ii) whether the government has
provided sufficient evidence to support its allegations.69 An affirmative finding with
respect to (i) and (ii) results in the denial of habeas relief and continued preventive
detention, at least until the Executive chooses to release the detainee through the
Periodic Review Board process,70 which will be discussed in more detail below. A
negative finding on either (i) or (ii) results in granting habeas relief and an order to
release of the detainee (which does not result in actual release until the U.S. government
has identified a nation willing to take the detainee). This case-by-case approach to each
detainee who wishes to challenge his detention is the focus of a process of complicated
and time-consuming habeas litigation before the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.
Developing a workable definition of “unlawful enemy belligerent” involves a
complex synthesis of existing LOAC principles related to preventive detention of
enemy belligerents and the realities of counter-terror operations. It is impossible to
ignore the reality that U.S. government has struggled as a result of the absence of
67

See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69–70 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that because the AUMF

authorized the use of “all necessary and appropriate force” against the non-state organizations involved
in the 9/11 attacks, the AUMF also implicitly authorized the use of such force, including detention,
against the members of those organizations and non-member supporters, regardless of whether they
directly participated in hostilities or not).
See Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice Withdraws “Enemy Combatant”
Definition
for
Guantanamo
Detainees
(March
13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-232.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012) (hereinafter “DOJ
Press Release”).
68

69

See WITTES, supra note 49, at 13 (citing In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, CMO

§II.A (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 2008) (“The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the petitioner’s detention is lawful”).
70

See Exec. Order No 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13227 § 3(a) (Mar. 7, 2011).
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express LOAC authorities applicable to combating transnational terrorism. Combined
with the operational challenges of conducting effective counter-terrorism operations,
this has made it difficult to develop a logical and clearly legitimate approach to
preventive detention of transnational terrorist operatives. As a result, the courts have
been called upon to intervene to clarify the scope of preventive detention authority, and
are now decisively engaged in rendering decisions that ostensibly will provide clearer
guidance on the scope of this authority. Whether such clarity will emerge, or if so
whether it will be operationally rational, remain open questions.
b. Extending The Traditional Legal Basis to Terrorist Detainees
Continuing uncertainty aside, it is clear the Hamdi Court’s holding that detention
of enemy belligerents was a necessary incident of war provided an important
foundation for subjecting terrorists to preventive detention.71 Hamdi, having been
captured on the field of battle after engaging U.S. and Coalition forces in combat, fell
into the core of any definition that could be adopted. The United States, however,
would extend the detention authority endorsed in Hamdi well beyond that core.
President Bush defined the category of individuals subject to wartime detention
in his Military Order # 1 directing the detention of captured terrorists at Guantanamo.
That Order included the following definition of individuals subject to preventive
detention:
(a) The term “individual subject to this order” shall mean any individual
who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from
time to time in writing that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the
relevant times;
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit,
acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation
71

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (“Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to

the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and
appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow
circumstances considered here”).
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therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as
their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or
economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals
described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of
this order; and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such
individual be subject to this order.72
This definition was broader than the category of enemy belligerent analyzed by the
Hamdi Court.73 Nonetheless, it provided the initial scope of detention authorization
relied on by the United States. Of particular significance is that it included within its
scope not only actual terrorist operatives captured during the planning, preparation, or
execution of hostilities, but also individuals who provide assistance to such
operatives.74 Additionally, a determination of membership in al Qaida – whatever the
basis for that determination – would itself be sufficient to trigger preventive detention
authority.75
72

Military Order No. 1, supra note 40, at § 2(a). While detention is authorized under Military Order No. 1,

few detainees were actually designated as subject to the Military Order for purpose of detention. See
JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES
IN FEDERAL COURTS DETENTIONS,

CONG. RES. SERV. (Order Code No. RL33180) at 9 n. 59 (last updated Jan.

29, 2009) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Rather,
such detention generally occurs under the authority granted in the AUMF, which courts have interpreted
to include the right to detain.
73

On at least two previous occasions, different branches of the federal government considered what

persons might be designated enemy combatants (or some synonym thereto). Compare Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942)“[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government,
and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents
within the meaning of ... the law of war”) with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“The United
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban
combatants who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.’ If the record establishes that
United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those . . . are authorized . . .”).
74

See Military Order No. 1, supra note 40, at § 2(a)(1).

75

See id. at § 2(a)(1)(i).
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Although President Bush attempted to prohibit judicial review of the legality of
the preventive detention regime established in Military Order No. 1, it soon became
clear that the federal courts were unwilling to acquiesce to his effort. In Rasul v. Bush,76
the Supreme Court rejected the President’s attempt to shield the Guantanamo detention
operations from judicial scrutiny by interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute to
run to the Guantanamo Naval Base.77 However, on the same day, the Court in Hamdi
indicated that judicial review of detentions might not be necessary should the executive
provide the type of minimal procedural protections the Court indicated were required
for U.S. citizen detainees.78 In response to the suggestion, the Department of Defense
implemented a new procedure for assessing the belligerent status of individuals
transported to Guantánamo.79
The process implemented by the Department of Defense involved two review
tribunals for all individuals initially designated by the executive branch as subject to
Military Order No. 1. The first tribunal was designated as a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal (CSRT). This CSRT would make the initial determination of whether an
individual transported to Guantánamo should continue to be detained preventively as
76

542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Supreme Court decided both Hamdi and Rasul on June 28, 2004.

77

Id. at 480 (discussing how the terms of the Guantanamo lease state that the United States “exercises

‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,” and as the petitioners are
under the exclusive custody of the United States, a United States District Court has jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus challenges from the petitioners under the federal habeas statute).
78

79

See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–34.
See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM, ORDER ESTABLISHING COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW

TRIBUNAL (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (last
visited Sept. 4, 2011) (hereinafter “CSRT Order”); DEP’T OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM, IMPLEMENTATION OF
COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL PROCEDURES FOR ENEMY COMBATANTS DETAINED AT U.S. NAVAL
BASE

GUANTANAMO

BAY,

CUBA.

(July

14,

2006),

available

at

http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2011)
(hereinafter “CSRT Procedures”). See also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF “BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES” IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM, CONG. RES. SERV., (Order

Code No. RL31367) (last updated Jan. 23, 2007) available

at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL3136.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2011) (discussing the historical
treatment of wartime detainees and summarizing legislative acts and proposals related to detention and
the war on terror considered by the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congressional sessions).
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the result of being an unlawful enemy combatant (the predecessor term to the currentlyused “unprivileged enemy belligerent”).80 The procedures adopted for the CSRT were
based loosely on the procedures provided for in Army Regulation (AR) 190-8,81 which
itself provided the procedures for conducting a review hearing required by the Geneva
Prisoner of War Convention when the POW status of a detainee is uncertain. However,
the CSRT provided additional procedural protections that were not set out in AR 1908.82 In the context of POW determinations, these tribunals are known as article 5
tribunals (referring to the article of the Prisoner of War Convention that requires a
tribunal to determine POW status when a captive’s status is “in doubt”).83

80

The CSRT Order stated that it applied only to foreign nationals held at Guantanamo. See CSRT Order,

supra note 82, at pmbl.
81

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8: ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL,

CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES § 3-15(b) (Oct. 1, 1997) (hereinafter “AR 190-8”).
82

See CSRT Order, supra note 82 at ¶ (g)–(h).

83

The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention states:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having
fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has
been determined by a competent tribunal.

GPW, supra note 17, at art. 5. The referenced Article 4 defines prisoners of war as:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and . . . other volunteer corps . . . provided that such
[organizations] fulfill the conditions of . . . being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates . . . having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance . . . carrying
arms openly . . . [and] conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces professing allegiance to a government or an
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof . . .
provided they have received authorization[] from the armed forces which they
accompany . . .
(5) Members of crews . . . of the merchant marine and . . . civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict . . .
(6) Inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having time to form
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However, because President Bush determined that the individuals subjected to
detention at Guantánamo could not qualify as POWs (therefore eliminating any doubt
that they might qualify for POW status),84 a different characterization was adopted for
the CSRT. Instead of determining whether they were entitled to POW treatment, a
CSRT would determine whether detainees were unlawful enemy combatants.85 If an
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the
laws and customs of war.
Id. at art. 4(A). Subsection (B) defines two additional categories of persons who are treated as POWs
under the Prisoner of War Convention. In his commentary to the Third Convention, Jean S. Pictet (who
served as an editor for the 1949 Geneva Conventions) describes the intent leading up to the adoption of
the second paragraph of Article 5:
At Geneva in 1949, it was first proposed that for the sake of precision the term
“responsible authority” should be replaced by “military tribunal”. This amendment was
based on the view that decisions which might have the gravest consequences should not
be left to a single person, who might often be of subordinate rank. The matter should be
taken to a court, as persons taking part in the fight without the right to do so are liable to
be prosecuted for murder or attempted murder, and might even be sentenced to capital
punishment. This suggestion was not unanimously accepted, however, as it was felt that
to bring a person before a military tribunal might have more serious consequences than a
decision to deprive him of the benefits afforded by the Convention. A further
amendment was therefore made to the Stockholm text stipulating that a decision
regarding persons whose status was in doubt would be taken by a “competent tribunal”,
and not specifically a military tribunal.
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE
TO THE

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 77 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) (internal citations omitted)

(hereinafter Pictet). It is clear that from the beginning of the codification of proper treatment for any
detained enemy combatants, whether lawful combatants entitled to POW status or unlawful combatants
not entitled thereto, that the military tribunal might not be the proper forum in which the status
determination should be made. However, it is telling that those who drafted and edited the 1949
Conventions did not truly imagine a world where combatants would truly be owned by no nation: in the
first sentence of his commentary on paragraph 2 of Article 5, Pictet writes: “This [paragraph] would
apply to deserters, and to persons who accompany the armed forces and have lost their identity card.” Id.
84

CNN, Bush says no POW status for detainees (Jan. 28, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-01-

28/us/ret.wh.detainees_1_detainees-camp-x-ray-unlawful-combatants?_s=PM:US (last visited October 20,
2011).
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See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS

CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURTS DETENTIONS, CONG. RES. SERV., (Order Code No. RL33180) at 7 (last
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individual was designated as an unlawful enemy combatant, detention would be
authorized indefinitely subject to an annual review to assess the continued detention
justification. This annual review would be conducted by a second tribunal, which had
been established prior to (and possibly in anticipation of) the Rasul and Hamdi
decisions, known as the Administrative Review Board (ARB).86
The CSRTs would obviously need a standard to apply to determine who would
remain in preventive detention and who had been improperly detained and transported
to Guantánamo. The order issued by the Secretary of Defense directing the Secretary of
the Navy (presumably because the Navy operates Guantanamo) to establish the CSRT
provided the following definition:
a. Enemy Combatant. For purposes of this Order, the term
“enemy combatant” shall mean an individual who was
part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners. This includes
any person who has committed a belligerent act or has
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed
forces. Each detainee subject to this Order has been
determined to be an enemy combatant through multiple
levels of review by officers of the Department of
Defense.87
This definition did seem to establish the requirement for a more direct link between the
detainee and the conduct of combat operations than that in Military Order No. 1.
However, by also including within the definition of detainable captive individuals who
updated Jan. 29, 2009) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf (last visited Aug. 11,
2010).
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http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
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See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM, IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

PROCEDURES FOR ENEMY COMBATANTS DETAINED AT U.S. NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. (July 14,
2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf (last
visited Sept. 4, 2011) (hereinafter “ARB Procedures”). See also infra n. 105, 161–62.
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CSRT Order, supra note 82, at ¶ (a).
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provided support to al Qaeda or the Taliban, it produced no significant difference
between the controlling standard to be applied by the CSRTs and the President’s initial
definition.
Another definition that emerged in response to the initial detainee decisions by
the Supreme Court was included in the Military Commission Act of 2006 (MCA). This
law was enacted by Congress in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan
striking down the military commission ordered established by President Bush in
Military Order No. 1.88 Congress enacted the MCA to both cure the procedural defects
that had doomed that original military commission and to ensure that unlawful enemy
combatants detained at Guantánamo would in fact be subject to trial by military
commission. Accordingly, it was necessary for Congress to provide its own definition of
who fell within MCA jurisdiction - a definition that by implication also indicates who
may be preventively detained. According to 10 U.S.C. § 948a, the persons subject to the
MCA include:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful
enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the
enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been
determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent
tribunal established under the authority of the President or
the Secretary of Defense.89

88

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions

applicable to the armed conflict against al Qaeda and further holding that the military commissions did
not constitute “regularly constituted courts” as required by Common Article 3).
89

10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006) (as enacted by Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120

Stat. 2600 (2006)). To be subject to trial by military commission, a person meeting the definition of
unlawful enemy combatant also must be an alien (i.e., not a U.S. citizen.) Id.

35

What is most significant about both the definition adopted by the Department of
Defense for purposes of the CSRTs, and the definition enacted by Congress in the 2006
MCA, is that each indicates that persons who materially support a terrorist group need
not actually commit belligerent acts in order to be treated as enemy combatants.
This broad definition would remain the basis for U.S. detentions for as long as
the detention process remained outside judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the United States
could, and often did, subject captured aliens believed to be part of or to have provided
support to al Qaeda to detention without charge or trial.90 The CSRTs did provide a
limited check on this process, but only in relation to the weight of the evidence
supporting the characterization and not in relation to the definition itself. Nor did the
limited judicial review of CSRT decisions subsequently authorized in the Detainee
Treatment Act provide detainees with a viable opportunity to challenge the scope of the
enemy combatant definition; it merely authorized judicial review of whether the CSRT
had followed its own procedures.91
In June 2008, the efforts of the President and Congress to limit judicial review of
preventive detention of Guantanamo detainees were nullified by the Supreme Court’s
decision of Boumediene v. Bush.92 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that (i) the detainees
enjoyed a constitutional privilege to petition the federal courts for habeas corpus; (ii)
the review procedures in the CSRTs and the Detainee Treatment Act were not an
adequate substitute for this privilege; and (iii) the detainees could challenge their
continued detention as a violation of both substantive and procedural due process.93
This decision cleared the way for detainees to challenge not only the process they had
90

See, e.g., Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, Detainee Bill Shifts Power to President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at

A1 (discussing the powers granted to the President under the post-9/11 enemy combatant detention
statutes, including the powers “to identify enemies, imprison them indefinitely and interrogate them —
albeit with a ban on the harshest treatment — beyond the reach of the full court reviews traditionally
afforded criminal defendants and ordinary prisoners”).
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See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, TREATMENT OF “BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES” IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM, CONG. RES.
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92
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See id. at 786–87.
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23,

2007)

available

at

been afforded to authorize their preventive detention, but perhaps more importantly
the scope of the definition of enemy belligerent itself – the definition pursuant to which
they were detained. The response by both the Executive Branch and the courts that
began to decide these challenges is ongoing at the time of this writing, although the
trend seems to be towards strengthening the link between the LOAC principle of
military necessity and the definition that justifies preventive detention. By opening the
door to federal court review, Boumediene placed Guantánamo detainees in what is in
actuality an enviable position.
c. Recent Evolution of the Detention Review Process: The Bagram Model
While many of the Supreme Court opinions related to detainment have issued
from suits filed by detainees held in Cuba, the Bagram Collection Point (BCP) near
Kabul, Afghanistan has been the primary detention facility for terrorist operatives
captured in Afghanistan since May 2002.94 From Bagram, some detainees were
transferred to Guantánamo, while others remained detained in Afghanistan.95 It was at
Bagram that the first detainee review boards occurred, wherein personnel from several
different military offices reviewed detainee files and applied the classified criteria that
might require the detainee to be transferred to another facility such as Guantanamo.96
From 2002 to the present, the detainee review boards conducted at detention facilities
have undergone multiple iterations in name, form, and procedure.
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See Prescott, supra note 24, at 9–14 (describing the history of the American presence at Bagram area and

the changes made with the Parwan detention facility); Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in
Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, 2010-JUN Army Law. 9, 15 (2010). See also infra note 154
(discussing the number of detainees at Guantanamo versus the number at Bagram, as well as the number
of detainees classified as eligible for release or transfer, and statistics on the number of military
commission trials held since 2001).
GlobalSecurity.org,
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Detainees,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_detainees.htm (last visited Dec. 27,
2011). The last news release announcing a transfer of detainees to Guantanamo occurred on September
12, 2007; the last transfer from Afghanistan to Guantanamo occurred in 2004. Id.
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Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 16 (“The composition of the DRB was approximately ten personnel,

including MI, MPs, the members of the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), and a judge advocate
legal advisor”).

37

The first set of detainability review meetings were conducted by Detention
Review Boards (DRBs) making assessments from 2002 until 2005. In September 2004,
transfers between Bagram and Guantanamo ceased, in large part due to the Supreme
Court’s rulings in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld three months prior.97 During the
initial two years of DRBs at Bagram, detainees were still being transferred from Bagram
to Guantanamo; thus, “the primary determination of the DRB was whether or not a
detainee met the (classified) criteria to be transferred to GTMO.”98 Additionally, a major
97

See id. at 18. As Rasul established that federal courts could decide whether noncitizens detained at

Guantanamo were wrongfully imprisoned and Hamdi held that detainees who are U.S. citizens must have
the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status before an impartial court, it is unsurprising that the
Administration would decide to cease transferring detainees to Guantanamo and thus effectively give
them access to the federal courts. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004). The Administration may have believed that keeping detainees out of Guantanamo would also
prevent them from challenging their detention in court due to the suspension of habeas corpus provided
in the MCA; in 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear habeas
petitions filed by detainees at Bagram. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’g 604 F.
Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ writs
of habeas corpus, as petitioners were held at Bagram, outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States
and thus previous statutory invocations of the Article I, Section 9 Suspension Clause served to deny the
district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ habeas petitions). See also Prescott, supra note 24, at 33–35
(discussing the district court’s six analytical factors parsed from Boumediene: “detainee citizenship,
detainee status, nature of the apprehension site, nature of the detention site, adequacy of the status
determination process and ‘practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s entitlement to the
writ’” and the court’s addition of a seventh factor: “’the length of a petitioner’s detention without
adequate review.’” As Boumediene had set out factors but had not deeply analyzed them, the district court
made determinations of which factors should carry more—or any—weight. See id.) (quoting Al Maqaleh
v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215–16 (2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
98

Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 16. Bovarnick describes the process of the DRB at the time:
All available information—whether sparse “evidence packets” from the capturing units
or packets built by interrogators in the BCP—was brought before the DRB to assess the
criteria. If the detainee did not appear to meet even the threshold determination of being
an enemy combatant due to the lack of evidence, as a courtesy (not a requirement), a
designated DRB member would contact the capturing unit after the pre-meeting to
inform the commander of the detainee's likely release recommendation if no further
information was provided. In general, this revelation would often prompt units to send
representatives to the DRB to “testify” about the circumstances of capture and provide
relevant evidence on the detainee's acts, if any, to make a case for continued detention.
As a detainee's case was presented, the members of the DRB would form a consensus
regarding whether the detainee met the criteria of an enemy combatant. If the consensus
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determination of whether to transfer a detainee to Guantanamo was the potential to
gather further intelligence from them.99 If the DRB determined that the detainee was an
enemy combatant but did not meet the Guantanamo transfer requirements, then
Military Intelligence would make a determination as to whether the detainee had future
intelligence value or presented a continued security threat; if so, they would continue to
be detained.100 At no point in the DRB process was the detainee informed that the DRB
was occurring; additionally, only those individuals actually detained at the BCP
underwent the DRB process, even though the BCP itself housed far fewer detainees
than the total number of individuals detained in Afghanistan.101
In 2004, Bagram was re-designated as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility
(BTIF) and in 2005, the DRBs changed to Enemy Combatant Review Boards (ECRBs).
The 2005 policy change would remain in effect until January 2007.102

was that there was not enough evidence, a recommendation for release would be made,
and the detainee would be placed on a “release list” to be approved by the Commander .
. . If the detainee was determined to be an enemy combatant, the next question was
whether the detainee met the criteria to be sent to GTMO.
Id. at 16–17.
99

Id. at 17.

100

Id.

101

Id. Bovarnick thusly describes the state of affairs for DRBs from 2002-2005:
Between May 2002 and June 2003, based on the . . . commander's guidance, the maximum
number of detainees in the BCP never exceeded one hundred. While the overall detainee
population, which included the Kandahar detention facility and other temporary
detention sites, was much larger, only those detainees at the BCP went through the DRB
process. During this first year, anywhere from ten to fifteen detainee files were reviewed
each week with each DRB session to review and discuss detainee files with the CJ2 [the
lead intelligence officer] lasting up to two hours. With the constant flow of detainees in
and out of the BCP, the number of files reviewed was simply a calculation to process the
ninety-day reviews. In the summer of 2003, the maximum number of detainees
authorized in the BCP doubled to two hundred; consequently, the number of files
reviewed at each DRB rose accordingly.

Id. (citations omitted).
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Id. at 18–19. Bovarnick notes that the process remained very similar to the 2002-2005 DRB review but

points out one positive change in transferring some detainees to local authorities for prosecution:
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In February 2007, the boards’ name changed again, to Unlawful Enemy
Combatant Review Boards (UECRB). Accompanying the name change were changes to
composition (dropping from five officers sitting the Board to three) and procedure
which would last until September 2009.103 The first and most important change,
implemented standard in April 2008, was officially providing a detainee with notice of
his UECRB.104 This notice provided a detainee with information as to the “general basis
Other than the name change and the alteration in board composition [reducing the
number of military officers sitting on the Boards], the procedures were similar to those
dating back to 2002; detainees could not appear in person before the boards, nor did they
have a personal representative (PR). The ECRBs met once per week, but instead of
holding pre-meetings like the ones that met in the 2002-2005 timeframe, the board
members were provided detainee packets in advance and then convened to discuss the
packets and vote on whether the detainee met the criteria for enemy combatant status.
The only oral evidence presented at the ECRB was still given by the MI personnel who
prepared the detainee packets. If the capturing unit had an interest, for either detention
or release, they could send a representative to the board to argue their position. [FN68]
While transfer to GTMO was no longer an option, the ECRB could recommend release or
continued detention in certain categories based on the level of threat. In an important
step forward in both the Rule of Law and counterinsurgency realms, new options for the
ECRBs were explored such as transfer to the Afghan authorities for prosecution or
repatriation programs.
Id. (citations omitted).
103

Addition to the Board’s duties included categorizing the detainees based on relative intelligence value

and threat level, and also determining the viability of local prosecution:
Detainees [were divided] into separate categories: High Level Enemy Combatant
(HLEC); Low Level Enemy Combatants (LLEC); and Threat only. Those who were to be
released were categorized as No Longer Enemy Combatant (NLEC). As the UECRB
worked its way through the six hundred detainees in the BTIF, the files of all detainees
assessed as LLECs were transferred to the DAB [Detainee Assessment Branch, which
made recommendations of prosecution to the local Afghan legal authorities]. The DAB,
comprised of military intelligence analysts and military criminal investigators, assessed
the detainee files for potential transfer to Afghan authorities for prosecution. To support
the Rule of Law mission, the DAB would only recommend transfer of cases for
prosecution if there was solid evidence. Those detainees not recommended for transfer
remained interned until their next review in six months.
Id. at 19–20 (citations omitted).
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Id. at 19. However, even in 2008, there were discrepancies between detainee rights at Bagram and the

rights of those detained in Guantanamo:
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of his detention” and allowed the detainee to appear before his board and make a
statement.105
In January 2009, President Obama signed three Executive Orders related to the
interrogation of detainees and procedures to be followed at detainment centers.106
Significantly, Order 13,493 included the following definition of who could be detained:
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those
responsible for those attacks.
The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of,
or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or
has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.107
Order 13,493 thus establishes the legal framework for a unit to detain an individual on
the battlefield; “if this threshold determination is not met on the battlefield, then a unit

[D]eficiencies included ‘no recourse to a neutral decisionmaker’ on status determinations;
no access to even a personal representative before the hearing board for the petitioners;
only an opportunity to submit a written statement to the board rather than to speak; no
right for the petitioners to see the evidence which inculpated them; and uncertain
evidentiary standards.
See Prescott, supra note 24, at 38 (quoting Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 226–27 (D.D.C. 2009),
rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
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Fixing Bagram: Strengthening Detention Reforms to Align with U.S. Strategic Priorities, HUM. RTS. FIRST

16 n.23 (Nov. 2009) (citing Declaration of Colonel Charles A. Tennison (Sept. 15, 2008)).
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See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 C.F.R. 4893 (2009) (ensuring lawful interrogations); Exec. Order No.

13,492, 74 C.F.R. 4897 (2009) (Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base and Closure of Detention Facilities); Exec. Order 13,493, 74 C.F.R. 4901 (2009) (Review of Detention
Policy Options).
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Exec. Order 13,493 § 1(a).
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has no authority to detain.”108 At the same time the President issued this Executive
Order, the Secretary of Defense was preparing to implement new board procedures and
the creation of the Afghanistan and Joint Task Force, the task force “charged with
running all detention operations in Afghanistan, and more specifically, the Legal
Operations Directorate of JTF 435, the team responsible for the daily operations of the
DRBs.”109 Notably and as discussed below, the Secretary of Defense’s July 2009
detention policy does not apply to approximately 80% of American troops operating in
Afghanistan.110
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Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 21. Once detained, the review board applies the procedures set forth in July

2009 by the Secretary of Defense in making initial detention decisions as well as during the regular
review process. See id.
109

Id. at 11 (explaining that the changes to the board process were “designed to ensure that due process

protections are afforded to the detainees housed at the new Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP).” Id.).
Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit’s May 2009 decision in al Maqaleh v. Gates—which occurred after
President Obama’s Executive Order but prior to the implementation of the Secretary of Defense’s new
policies—did not analyze or discuss “the new procedure . . . put in place [at Parwan, and thus] the issue
of how much process Parwan detainees should be afforded in their status hearings remains to be seen.”
Id. at 48.
110

The 2009 policy change applies only to USFOR-A, which is composed of
U.S. Special Operations Forces (the capturing units), Joint Task Force 435, which runs all
detention operations in Afghanistan (discussed in detail below), and other critical
enablers, such as route clearance and Palladin units.

Id. at 21. The remaining 80%+ of U.S. troops are deployed as part of the international ISAF mission; their
detainment policy is discussed infra at note 116. This arrangement is further explained by Prescott:
The status of military personnel who are part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the
original U.S. mission in Afghanistan, is set out in an exchange of diplomatic notes
between the U.S. and Afghanistan. Under this arrangement, Afghanistan agrees to waive
criminal jurisdiction over these personnel, and to allow U.S. personnel and equipment
freedom of movement into and out of Afghanistan to conduct operations without the
need to pay taxes and duties or to obtain visas. Specifically, U.S. personnel are “accorded
a status equivalent to that accorded to the administrative and technical staff” of the U.S.
Embassy, and are immune to Afghan criminal jurisdiction. The Parwan Detention
Facility is considered an OEF mission. The other legal regime governing the presence of
U.S. personnel is found in the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghanistan. The majority of U.S>
forces in Afghanistan, and almost all of the international forces, are covered by the MTA.
Under its terms, Afghanistan has waived criminal, tax and customs jurisdiction over
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An important note is that the 2009 procedures established by the President and
DoD are applicable only to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom
(USFOR-A/OEF), not the International and Security Assistance Force (ISAF); while
forces of USFOR-A/OEF have all the power given by the President to detain
individuals in Afghanistan, ISAF follows a different detainment policy.111 The major
difference in detention authority between USFOR-A/OEF and ISAF is that “USFOR-A
can send captured personnel to the DFIP whereas ISAF units (including the U.S. forces
assigned to ISAF) cannot.”112
In March 2011, President Obama signed an Executive Order related to the
continuing status review of Guantanamo detainees.113 This Order established Periodic
Review Boards (PRBs) for all detainees and mandated an initial review for each
ISAF forces and has afforded them complete freedom of movement across its borders
and within the country.
Prescott, supra note 24, at 12–13 (citations omitted).
111

See Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 21. The ISAF is part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and roughly

83% of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (nearly 78,500 out of 95,000 personnel) are assigned to ISAF. Id. The
roughly 17,000 U.S. troops not assigned to ISAF fall under USFOR-A and continue to operate under the
authority of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Id.
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Id. The policy for individuals captured by ISAF on the battlefield is as follows:
All insurgents captured by ISAF troops must be turned over to the Afghan National
Security Directorate (NDS), either within ninety-six hours [the general time frame since
2005] for non-U.S. ISAF units or fourteen days for U.S. ISAF units [the U.S.-specific time
frame since March 2010]. The NDS is Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency with
jurisdiction over all insurgent and terrorist activity. In essence, the NDS has the right of
first refusal to accept the transfer of captured personnel believed to be insurgents or
terrorists. In addition to the personnel that might be expected to make up an intelligence
agency, the NDS also has a staff of investigators that specifically work to prepare cases
for prosecution within the Afghan criminal justice system. Currently, a team of Afghan
prosecutors and judges with special expertise are temporarily assigned to work
exclusively with the NDS to coordinate this effort to try suspected insurgents and
terrorists under the appropriate Afghan criminal laws within the Afghan criminal justice
system. Each province in Afghanistan has at least one judge and several prosecutors
assigned to work on NDS cases.

Id. at 21–22 (citations omitted).
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See Exec. Order 13,567, 76 C.F.R. 13277 (Mar. 7, 2011).
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detainee to occur no later than March 7, 2012. The greatest changes to the detainment
review process included in this Order include the right of detainees to be assisted by
private counsel (although counsel will not be appointed or provided by the
Government and thus must be retained privately by the detainee) and for the detainee
himself to make an oral or written statement to the PRB, present information, answer
the PRB’s questions, and call witnesses on his own behalf.114 If the PRB determines that
the detainee should not be released, the Order states that “continued detention . . . shall
be subject to subsequent full reviews and hearings by the PRB on a triennial basis.”115
Additionally, continued detainment will be “subject to a file review every 6 months in
the intervening years between full reviews”; the detainee is not permitted to verbally
address the PRB conducting a file review but may “make a written submission in
connection with each file review.” The Order provides that the file review will include
any relevant new information about the detainee collected and compiled since the
previous review and that “[i]f, during the file review, a significant question is raised as
to whether the detainee’s continued detention is warranted . . . the PRB will promptly
convene a full review . . .”116
The detainment assessment and review process has undergone drastic changes
between its inception in 2002 and President Obama’s 2011 Executive Order. Where
initial determinations were made primarily on the basis of future intelligence gathering,
recent changes have provided increasing amounts of traditional due process to
detainees not only in Guantanamo, but in Afghanistan—detainees who do not currently
have the power to challenge their detentions with habeas corpus.117

Part III: Powell v. Alabama and the Significance of Value Based Legal Representation
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Id. at § 3(a)(2).
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Id. at § 3(b).
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Id. at § 3(c).
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See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’g 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding

that the Military Commissions Act’s invocation of the Suspension Clause precludes detainees at Bagram,
located outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States, from challenging their detention in federal
district court using habeas corpus).
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When the Supreme Court struck down the convictions in the first round of
Scottsboro trials, the standards of zealous advocacy were customary at best. Unlike
today, lawyers were not bound to ethical codes of conduct that imposed this duty.118
Nonetheless, representation of a criminal defendant by an individual inculcated in the
lawyer ethos of zealousness was central to the Court’s decision. The Alabama Supreme
Court had rejected Powell’s claim of denial of meaningful representation based on the
events the day of his trial. When the case was called, the trial judge noted that the
defendants desired, but did not have counsel. In response, he called upon the local bar
to fill the void. Two lawyers apparently answered the call. This aspect of the trials was
noted by the United States Supreme Court.119 However, for that Court, the fatal flaw
around which all of the Justices coalesced was the unavoidable conclusion that
whatever representation the defendants had received was at best pro forma, and did not
comport with the customary standards of zealousness central to the lawyer ethos.120
Zealous commitment to the interests of a client, even when disagreeing with the
client’s cause or conduct, is indeed central to the lawyer ethos, and a fundamental
foundation of meaningful representation. It is also central to the ethical obligations of a
lawyer acting as an advocate, as indicated by the American Bar Association Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which charges lawyers to “zealously assert[] the client’s
position under the rules of the adversary system.”121
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See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983).
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See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53–56 (1932) (noting the casualness with which two attorneys, one

of whom was from Tennessee and not a member of the Alabama bar but nevertheless offered to assist in
the defense, became counsel of record for the Scottsboro Boys on the day of trial. In criticizing the failure
of the trial court to specifically appoint counsel, the Court noted, “until the very morning of the trial no
lawyer had been named or definitely designated to represent the defendants.” The Court then held that
the trial court’s designation of the entire local bar as “counsel” for the defendants, an appointment made
strictly for the purpose of arraignment, “even if made for all purposes, would, in our opinion, have fallen
far short of meeting, in any proper sense, a requirement for the appointment of counsel”).
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See id. at 59 (“The record indicates that the appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active . .

. Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in
any substantial sense. To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities”).
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. § 2 (1983). However, the Preamble is purely aspirational, not a

binding Rule upon attorneys. In Rule 1.3, the Model Rules states: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1983). While
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The duty of zealousness is not something created by the Model Rules. Well
before jurisdictions even began to codify ethical standards for the legal profession,
commitment to a client’s cause and zealous advocacy of that cause have been at the core
of the legal profession. One early and profoundly compelling example of this was John
Adams’s representation of the British soldiers accused of murder for their part in the
Boston Massacre.122 Adams risked the scorn of his community to fulfill his obligation to
his clients, who were all acquitted. The history of American law is replete with other
examples equally inspiring. In fact, one of those examples was part of the sordid story
of the Scottsboro trials.
After the Supreme Court overturned the original convictions, all of the
defendants were retried. One of them, Haywood Patterson, was represented by Sam
Leibowitz.123 Leibowitz, a lawyer from New York who immigrated to the United States
with his family as a young boy, was hired by the International Labor Defense (a group
associated with the Communist Party of America) to represent Patterson. Leibowitz
threw himself into a truly hostile environment in the Alabama community of Decautor.
Rule 1.3 does not explicitly discuss a “zealous representation” requirement for attorneys, commentary to
the Rules express the intent of the Model Rule drafters. In Comment 1 to Rule 1.3, the Model Rules state:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1983). Similar Rules appear in customized State Rules of
Professional Conduct. For example, Texas’s Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct state:
[A] lawyer should act with competence, commitment and dedication to the interest of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer should feel a moral or
professional obligation to pursue a matter on behalf of a client with reasonable diligence
and promptness despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer.
Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.01 cmt. 6.
122

For a transcript of Adams’s defense speech, see JOHN ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, NO. 64.

REX V. WEMMS 260–70, available at http://www.bostonmassacre.net/trial/acct-adams1.htm (last visited
January 3, 2012).
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Leibowitz ultimately represented all of the Scottsboro Boys. Patterson’s trial was the second of four

total. Ozie Powell, whose name appears in the style of cause for Powell v. Alabama, was tried with four of
the other Boys after Patterson; Patterson was convicted within minutes of the Powell trial beginning.
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Having amassed a remarkable record of seventy-seven acquittals in seventy-eight first
degree murder trials, Leibowitz devoted the next four years of his life to Patterson’s
defense. Neither the urgings of his friends and family nor the routine threats to his life
deterred him from his duty.
Ultimately, Leibowitz fell short in his efforts, and Patterson was again convicted;
Patterson was incarcerated until his successful escape in 1947. He died five years later of
cancer while in a Michigan prison for an unrelated manslaughter conviction.124
Nevertheless, Leibowitz’s commitment to perhaps the most “radioactive” client
in Alabama history stands to this day as a model of legal professionalism. Similar
stories, although perhaps less dramatic, play out every day in the American legal
system. The ability to distinguish the advocacy of a client’s legal cause from the
embracing that cause is core aspect of zealous advocacy, and one of the most difficult
concepts for new law students to understand. “How can anyone defend the guilty?” is a
question most criminal law professors encounter early in a student’s career. The clear
answer appears in the pre-amble to the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers: “a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position
under the rules of the adversary system.”125
Lawyers understand that this zealous advocacy, even when on behalf of an
individual accused of the most heinous crime, ultimately contributes to justice and the
rule of law because:
[A] lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on
behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done.126
It is unlikely that the average non-lawyer understands the significance of this lawyer
ethos. Few lay persons can reconcile the concept of justice with the effective
representation of those who appear obviously guilty. But lawyers are educated on (and
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ostensibly understand) the true meaning of the presumption of innocence, and how
zealous representation ensures individuals accused by the government are afforded the
process they are due before that legal presumption is rebutted. Convicting the guilty is
unquestionably important, but it is zealous representation of a defendant in the
adversarial process that ensures the credibility of these convictions. As Justice Scalia
famously wrote on the notion that ensuring all process due is completely supersedes
the interest in merely obtaining convictions in criminal charges, “[d]ispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes.”127
The relationship between zealous representation and legitimate criminal justice
process has been central to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.128 In its landmark
opinion of Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
(incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment as a component of
fundamental due process rights) required more than merely the right to be represented;
it required that the state provide for representation of indigent criminal defendants.129
The motivation for this decision was not merely the credibility of the criminal justice
process. Instead, it was protection of individuals from post-conviction incarceration
without meaningful process. Because all of these concerns were inextricably intertwined
in Gideon’s challenge, the Court explicitly addressed only the right to counsel in the
criminal justice process. However, the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence determining
scope of the Gideon right to counsel indicates that protection of the liberty interest, and
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
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The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Through selective incorporation, the Supreme Court has
held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that “a
provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment” and that the right to counsel is one of those fundamental and
essential rights) (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963)).
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372 U.S. at 344–45.
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not merely protection from false conviction, is the dominant interest related to this
right.
Gideon did not clearly delineate situations that trigger the right government
provided counsel to indigent criminal defendants. In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
held that the Gideon right to counsel applied whenever an individual was charged with
a crime that resulted in conviction and even only one day of criminal incarceration.130
The Court rejected the proposal to use the felony/misdemeanor dichotomy as the
trigger for the right; however, the Court also rejected the proposal to extend the right to
any individual charged with a criminal offense.131 Instead, it was the combined effect of
a criminal charge and incarceration that created a sufficient interest to justify imposing
a burden on the government to provide counsel to indigent defendants. Referring to an
earlier decision that was less emphatic on the issue, the Court concluded:
In Argersinger, the Court rejected arguments that social cost or a lack of
available lawyers militated against its holding, in some part because it
thought these arguments were factually incorrect. But they were rejected
in much larger part because of the Court's conclusion that incarceration
was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a
criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had been offered appointed
counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit
in such a rule.132
This incarceration trigger remains in effect to this day. Accordingly, even defendants
charged with minor misdemeanor offenses are entitled to free representation in the
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Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 367 (1979) (holding that a court is not required “to appoint counsel for a

criminal defendant . . . who is charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction
is authorized but not [actually] imposed”).
131

See id. at 373–74 (holding that “the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State
has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense” after determining that that
“actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment [and
thus an actual sentence of imprisonment is the proper] line defining the constitutional right to
appointment of counsel”).
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Id. at 372–73 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972)).
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event that their sentence includes any confinement.133 In contrast, a defendant charged
with a serious felony would not have a similar right in the odd event that the judge’s
punishment did not include confinement.
It is of course true that criminal adjudication is the only context in which this
incarceration standard applies. However, the Supreme Court’s focus on incarceration as
the trigger for the right of representation is indicative of perhaps a broader principle:
zealous representation is an essential safeguard to protect the interests of individuals
subjected to incarceration. Although not cast in terms of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, this principle was significant element in one of the rare Supreme Court
decisions addressing the constitutionality of non-punitive preventive detention. In
United States v. Salerno, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a preventive
detention provision included within the Bail Reform Act of 1984.134 Salerno, an alleged
high-level mafia leader, was pending trial for serious federal criminal offenses.135
Pursuant to the authority provided by Congress in the Bail Reform Act, Salerno was
subjected to preventive pretrial detention. The basis for this detention was not that
Salerno represented a flight risk or danger to the judicial process (the traditional bases
for depriving an individual charged with an offense of liberty prior to trial), but that he
presented a threat of serious future criminal misconduct, proven by a preponderance of
the evidence.136
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See id. at 373. See also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40 (“Under the rule we announce today, every judge will

know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local
law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel”).
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481 U.S. 739 (1987). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (“If, after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds that

no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the
detention of the person before trial”); id. at (e)(2)–(3) (stating conditions that, if applicable to the instant
case, create “a rebuttable presumption . . . that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably
assure the safety of any other person and the community”).
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Specifically, Salerno and a codefendant were charged with 29 violations of the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 743.
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The Bail Reform Act provided that “[i]f, after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds that no condition or

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety
of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial.” 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The Act also set forth criteria for the judicial officer to consider in making a pretrial
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Salerno challenged the statute, asserting that the authorization for preventive
pretrial detention based on risk of future criminal misconduct was inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence and due. The Court rejected Salerno's challenge, holding that
the act did not contravene the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.137 The Court's
holding was based on both a substantive and procedural foundation. From a
substantive due process perspective, the Court concluded that the normal process
associated with criminal adjudication is triggered only when an individual is subjected
to punitive detention, and not administrative detention.138 By characterizing the
preventive detention authorized by the Bail Reform Act as non-punitive, the court
effectively exempted the detention from the normal due process standards associated
with incarceration.139 However, the Court emphasized the importance of providing for
a meaningful adjudicative process before an individual may be subjected to nonpunitive detention.140
The Court concluded that the process established for authorizing preventive
detention pursuant to the Bail Reform Act met this process. That process included both
detainment decision, including the types of crimes to which the act applied, as well as a number of other
factors: “the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the Government’s evidence
against the arrestee, the arrestee’s background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the
danger [to any person or to the community] posed by the suspect’s release.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742–43
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)).
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Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51 (holding that “in circumstances where the government's interest is

sufficiently weighty, [the individual’s strong interest in liberty may] be subordinated to the greater needs
of society.”In application, “[w]hen the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that,
consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat”).
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indictment administrative detention occurring prior to a probable cause hearing and determining that “a
period of administrative detention may occur before the evidence of probable cause is presented to a
neutral magistrate”) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)).
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detention).
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an adversarial hearing and a right to counsel. The Court emphasized the significance of
this process, and the ability of an individual subjected to preventive detention to test the
government’s allegation in this adversarial process. Salerno therefore bolsters the
assumption that it is the risk of incarceration, and not necessarily the punitive purpose
for the incarceration, that implicates the critical importance of zealous representation.
Part IV: Extending Legal Representation to the Long-Term Detention Process
a. Adopting a Punitive/Administrative Divide in the War on Terror
Providing counsel for an individual subjected to the risk a punitive incarceration
is also a central component of the legitimacy of the U.S. military justice system. In fact,
the Uniform Code of Military Justice exceeds the requirements of the Sixth Amendment
by requiring defense counsel for any individual charged for trial by court-martial that
may result in a federal criminal conviction.141 Even defendants who are not sentenced to
punitive incarceration are entitled to the assistance of detailed military counsel,
irrespective of their ability to pay for their own representation.142
When President Bush issued the order for the creation of a military commission
to try captured unlawful enemy combatants following the September 11th terrorist
attacks, he adopted the same right to counsel rule applicable to courts-martial. That
order included the requirement that military counsel be detailed to defend any
individual charged for trial by military commission.143 Although this order, and the
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The accused has the right to be represented by counsel during an investigation and at trial. Article 27

provides the qualifications for trial counsel and defense counsel. Article 32 provides the right of an
accused to be represented by counsel at investigation, and Article 38 provides the same right at trial. See
10 U.S.C. §§ 827(a), 832(b), 838(b). Under the UCMJ, an accused does not have a right to be represented at
a summary court-martial. However, these courts do not issue federal criminal convictions. Further, a
defendant at a summary court-martial is provided free counsel to prepare for and appeal the results of
the court-martial. See 10 U. S. C. §§ 838(b)(1), (c).
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See generally id.
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See DEPT. OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1 § 4(C) (Mar. 21, 2002). In Section 4(C), the

DOD provides for defense of an accused at a military commission trial:
(2) [T]he Chief Defense Counsel [defined in section 4(C)(1)] shall detail one or more
Military Officers who are judge advocates of any United States armed force to conduct
the defense for each case before a Commission (“Detailed Defense Counsel”). The duties
of the Detailed Defense Counsel are:
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military commission it created became the subject of substantial criticism and ultimate
invalidation by the Supreme Court, the provision of legal representation was one bright
spot in the commission process. The experienced and highly competent military defense
lawyers detailed to this duty threw themselves into the task of defending their clients
and identifying every conceivable flaw in the commission process. Their efforts were
applauded by virtually all critics of the military commission, and ultimately resulted in
not only successful challenges on behalf of their clients, but also to recognition by the
American Civil Liberties Union.144
For experts in military law, the efforts of these defense lawyers were
unsurprising. Military lawyers, like their civilian counterparts, are taught to embrace
the ethical obligation to zealously represent their clients, even when those clients are
extremely unpopular. Within each military service, the Judge Advocate General (the
senior legal officer for the service) has established a separate military defenders office.
Military lawyers assigned to these organizations operate under a chain of command
distinct from that of their prosecution counterparts, and are constantly reminded of the
importance of their independent and zealous commitment to their clients.145

(a) To defend the Accused zealously within the bounds of the law without regard
to personal opinion as to the guilt of the Accused; and
(b) To represent the interests of the Accused in any review process as provided
by this Order. . .
Id. at § 4(C)(2)(a)–(b). Defendants in military commission trials were also given the right to replace their
Detailed Defense Counsel with a different JAG lawyer, and could retain the services of a civilian attorney
meeting certain defined qualifications. See id. at § 4(C)(3). While a defendant could replace one JAG
defense attorney for another, the Order did not give defendants the right to proceed without any JAG
defense counsel at all. See id. at § 4(C)(4) (“The Accused must be represented at all relevant times by
Detailed Defense Counsel”).
144

2007 Roger N. Baldwin Medal of Liberty Award, ACLU.ORG, http://www.aclu.org/2007-roger-n-

baldwin-medal-liberty-award (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (listing the five JAG officers, at least one from
each branch of the armed forces, who received the award in 2005 for their defense of Guantanamo
detainees).
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Justice,

Army

Regulation

27-10

§

6-3

(Nov.

16,

2005),

available

at

http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r27_10.pdf (last visited January 3, 2012). Chapter 6 of AR 27-12
describes the United States Army Trial Defense Service (USATDS), which provides counsel to defendants
in Army courts-martial. Section 6-3 describes the ultimate command structure of USATDS as follows:
USATDS counsel are supervised, managed, and rated solely by their respective USATDS
supervisory chain. Staff judge advocate and installation support responsibilities for TDS

53

For observers outside the military, however, the commitment of the military
lawyers representing Guantanamo defendants charged with engaging in heinous acts of
terror against United States seemed surprising. How could members of an institution
charged with the responsibility of engaging in combat against these individuals devote
themselves to such representation? The answer to this question is inherent in the
concept of zealous representation. The lawyers assigned to these duties understood
intuitively that by advocating on behalf of their clients they in no way endorsed their
client’s cause.146 Instead, like all professional defense lawyers they recognized that their
efforts would ultimately contribute to the credibility and legitimacy of justice dispensed
by the military commission.
The critical role of zealous representation in the military commission process
would, ironically, be central to the downfall of the President’s commission. In Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court struck down the legality of the military commission

[Trial Defense Service] counsel . . . apply, regardless of the TDA [table of distribution and
allowances] or modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) authorization
that the individual TDS counsel occupies. The Commander and Commandant, TJAGLCS
[The Judge-Advocate General’s Legal Center and School], provide professional control
and supervision of USATDS and its counsel, including UCMJ authority. The
Commander, USALSA [U.S. Army Legal Services Agency], exercises other command
functions for USATDS counsel . . .
Id. at § 6-3. The USATDS as a whole is overseen by a Chief, designated by the Judge-Advocate General of
the Army (TJAG). Id. at §6-3(a). Below the Chief are the Regional Defense Counsel (RDC), who is
“[r]esponsible for the performance of the USATDS mission within a region [and] [t]he supervisor of all
senior defense counsel within the region”; a region is “the major subordinate supervisory and control
element of USATDS . . . encompass[ing] a geographical area designated by TJAG.” Id. at § 6-3(b), (c)(1).
Below the RDC is the senior defense counsel, who is “responsible for the performance of the USATDS
mission within the area serviced by a field office” as well as “the direct supervisor of all trial defense
counsel within a field office [or its subsidiary branch offices.” Id. at § 6-3(f)(1). At the bottom of the
hierarchy are trial defense counsel, whose job is “to represent Soldiers in courts-martial, administrative
boards, and other proceedings and act as consulting counsel as required by law or regulations.” Id. at § 63(g). The USATDS is therefore fully self-contained, and not subject to the supervisory control of a base
commander, unlike JAG prosecutors; trial defense counsel and their superiors effectively report only to
TJAG himself. This separate command structure is crucial to trial defense counsel’s ability to zealously
represent defendants at courts-martial.
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Acceptance of this understanding permeates legal training at all levels. See AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L

CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2005) (“A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by
appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s economic, social, or moral views or
activities”).
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convened pursuant to Military Order Number 1.147 The issue that brought the case
before the Court was a challenge to the rule permitting the exclusion of the defendant
from the proceeding. While defendant's counsel would be present for all proceedings,
the rule prohibited defense counsel from disclosing to the excluded client what
transpired in his absence. The Supreme Court held that this rule violated both the
minimum standards for fair process included within the Geneva Conventions and the
procedural requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice applicable to military
commissions.148
Congress responded to the Hamdan decision with the Military Commission Act
of 2006, its statutory resurrection of the military commission.149 Congress, like the
President, provided for the appointment of military counsel for any individual charged
for trial by the new commission. However, unlike the original commission, the MCA
did not permit exclusion of the accused from court proceedings (except for good cause,
such as disruption of the proceedings). Congress even added a right to a "learned"
defense counsel for all capital cases. Like their pre-MCA counterparts, the military
counsel detailed to defend unlawful enemy combatants at the military commission
continue to embrace the highest standards of ethical performance.
The provision of legal representation for individuals captured in the context of
the Global War on Terror has, however, been restricted to the criminal prosecution
context. No analogous provision had, prior to the 2011 NDAA, been extended to
individuals subject to non-criminal preventive detention. Nonetheless, non-criminal
detentions account for the vast majority of individuals subjected to wartime indefinite
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See id. at 630–631, 634–35 (holding Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applicable to the

conflict with al Qaeda, and thus requiring Hamdan to be tried under a court constituted as Common
Article 3 required. Additionally, the Court held that there was no “evident practical need” for military
commission procedure to deviate from procedures applicable to courts-martial under the UCMJ) (citing
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 646–48) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also GPW, supra note 17, at art. 3(d) (prohibiting
“the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions [against people who are hors de combat in
armed conflicts not of an international character] without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples”) (emphasis added).
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See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–49o.
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detention power.150 And, as former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted when use of
military commissions was initially announced, an acquittal by these tribunals would

150

As of January 2012, 172 detainees remained at Guantanamo, while about 600 had been transferred out;
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Guantanamo since 2001). At Bagram, near Kabul, Afghanistan, the number of prisoners has varied:
around 450 detainees were at Bagram in July 2205; this number grew to 645 by September 2009 then
shrank to 600 detainees by the time President Obama took office in January 2011; the number grew again
to roughly 1700 in May 2011 and then to allegedly 3000 in November 2011. See Seth Doane & Phil
Hirschkorn, Bagram: The other Guantanamo?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/830118563_162-57323856/bagram-the-other-guantanamo/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2012); John Hanrahan, Bagram
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visited Jan. 8, 2012); American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Obtains List of Bagram Detainees (Jan. 15, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-obtains-list-bagram-detainees (last visited Jan. 8, 2012); Ron
Synovitz, Afghanistan: Manhunt Continues For Four Suspected Al-Qaeda Fighters, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO
LIBERTY (July 12, 2005), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1059859.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). By
contrast, as of January 2010, only 11 individuals had been charged with violations of the laws of war or
providing material support to terrorism by military commission; at least two of them (Benyam
Mohammed and Mohamed Jawad) had all charges against them dropped, and two (David Hicks and
Salim Hamdan; the latter was Osama bin Laden’s driver) were sentenced, served their sentences (and in
the case of Hamdan, received over five years of time served from his detention), and were released to
other countries. See also Ken Gude, Criminal Courts Are Tougher on Terrorists than Military Detention,
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FOR
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PROGRESS
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2010),

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/criminal_courts_terrorists.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012)
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acquitted him of conspiracy and returned a guilty verdict only on the charge of material support for
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Military Commissions Cases, http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (last visited Jan. 5,
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not necessarily result in release of detainees.151 Instead, it was more probable an
acquitted detainee would simply be returned to non-punitive preventive detention.152
The almost inevitable reality of indefinite detention has, however, spurred a
credible effort to enhance to the preventive detention process. This effort first focused
on Guantanamo – initially in response to the Supreme Court’s extension of habeas
jurisdiction to Guantanamo detainees and the Court’s suggestion that enhanced process
might eliminate the necessity for judicial review.153 The Court would ultimately
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During a news briefing on March 28, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made the following

statements regarding detainee acquittal before a military commission and possible release following
acquittal:
There have been some murmurs in the media about detainees held at Guantanamo Bay,
and specifically whether if one who is tried by a military commission and, if acquitted,
whether they would then be released or whether they would still be detained . . . If one
were to be acquitted by a commission of . . . a specific criminal charge, that would not
necessarily change the fact that that individual remains an enemy who was captured
during an armed conflict, and therefore one who could reasonably be expected to go back
to his terrorist ways if released . . . In some cases it might not be possible to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual committed a particular crime, and
therefore he might be acquitted of that crime. However, it does not change the fact that
he is an enemy combatant. He may be guilty of other crimes, but at the minimum he is
someone to be kept off the battlefield . . . Even in a case where an enemy combatant
might be acquitted, the United States would be irresponsible not to continue to detain
them until the conflict is over. Detaining enemy combatants for the duration of a conflict
is universally recognized as responsible and lawful. This is fully consistent with the
Geneva Conventions and other war authorities.
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense News Briefing (Mar. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3380.
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See id.
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See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), superseded by statute,

Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a), Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), as recognized in Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In Hamdi, the a plurality of the Court held that Hamdi, as
an American citizen, had a right to challenge his detention; however, the Court limited the resources due
to Hamdi in doing so while noting that at least some core constitutional protections must be preserved
and made available:
[W]hile the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings
may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to
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backtrack on this suggestion when it held in Boumediene v. Bush that the process
implemented by the President did not sufficiently protect the rights of Guantanamo
detainees, who were therefore constitutionally entitled to challenge their detention by
writ of habeas corpus.154 However, by that time, the process established by order of the
Secretary of Defense had been endorsed and enhanced by Congress in the form of the
Detainee Treatment Act (as supplemented by the Military Commission Act).
The combined effect of executive, legislative, and judicial action led to a military
detention review hearing to determine who qualifies for indefinite detention at
Guantanamo (the Combatant Status Review Tribunal), an annual review by military
authorities to determine if continued detention remains justified (called the Annual
Review Board until March 2011), and judicial review of military detention decisions by
the District of Columbia District and Circuit Courts. While this process has resulted in
the reclassification of a number of detainees,155 legal representation is provided only

military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as
to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to
be heard by an impartial adjudicator.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535. On the same day that the Court handed down Hamdi, it released its opinion in
Rasul, holding that individuals detained at Guantanamo were entitled to challenge their detention by
filing statutorily-authorized writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. See Rasul, 524 U.S. at 485. In holding that the principles set forth in Johnson v. Eisentrager did
not apply to the U.S. facility at Guantanamo, the Court considered the historical reach of habeas corpus in
ultimately determining that
[a]pplication of the habeas statute to persons detained at the base is consistent with the
historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At common law, courts exercised habeas
jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as
well as the claims of persons detained in the so-called “exempt jurisdictions,” where
ordinary writs did not run, and all other dominions under the sovereign's control.
Id. at 481–82 (citations omitted). See also 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3) (granting federal district courts
statutory authority to hear habeas claims asserted by any person “within their respective jurisdictions”
who claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States”).
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when cases reach Article III judicial review on writs of habeas corpus. Prior to the
President’s March 2011 Executive order, no legal representation was provided to
detainees before either the CSRT or the ARB. Instead, in an apparent analogy to the
procedures established by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War156 for resolving uncertainty as to whether a captive qualifies as a
prisoner of war, detainees were provided with a U.S. military officer to serve as a nonlegal representative at the CSRT (the ARB was a “paper” review so no representation is
provided).157
An analogous evolution of detention review procedure has occurred at the U.S.
detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan.158 Ironically, while Guantanamo has been the
focal point of the majority of scrutiny, the Bagram/Parwan operation accounts for the
vast majority of individuals who have and continue to be subjected to preventive
detention by the United States.159 However, a serious effort to revise the detention
process in order to mitigate the risk of invalid detentions has only recently been

2006, the ARBs had determined that while three detainees could be released and 107 could be repatriated
to the custody of their home countries, all still remained detained in Guantanamo at that time).
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See GPW, supra note 17, at art. 5 (granting detainees whose POW status is in question “the protection of

the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal”).
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See CSRT Order, supra note 82, at ¶ (c) (describing the nature of the detainee’s non-legal personal

representative). See generally CSRT Procedures, supra note 82, at Encl. (1); ARB Procedures, supra note 89,
at Encl. (3)–(4). See also GPW, supra note 17, at art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons,
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal”).
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Andrew Gumbal, Bagram Detention Centre Now Twice the Size of Guantanamo, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 8,
2008,

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bagram-detention-centre-now-twice-the-size-of-

guantanamo-768803.html. By 2011, Bagram housed over 1700 detainees: almost triple the number
detained there in 2008 at the end of the Bush Administration. Justin Elliott, The Gitmo No One Talks About,
SALON, June 4, 2011, http://www.salon.com/2011/06/04/bagram_obama_gitmo/. As of May 2011, only 171
detainees were still at Guantanamo. Sky News, Afghan Inmate Dies at Guantanamo in ‘Suicide’, May 19,
2011, http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/15994893.
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implemented. As will be explained in the next section, this effort resulted in a process
analogous to the CSRT process at Guantanamo. While this has undoubtedly improved
the credibility of the U.S. detention operation and added substantial protections to
potential detainees, like their Guantanamo counterparts DoD did not provided legal
representation as part of this revision. Instead, an approach analogous to the ‘prisoner’s
representative’ approach in the GPW was extended to Afghanistan.160
Before turning to an overview of the revisions to the detainee review process, a
brief discussion of the flaw in the GPW analogy is in order. As one of the authors has
previously written, while it is common to invoke the limited process afforded to
prisoners of war pursuant to the GPW as a justification of limiting procedural rights for
unprivileged belligerents, this argument is fundamentally flawed.161 A POW and an
160

The term “prisoners’ representative” is used in several articles of the Third Geneva Convention.

Prisoners’ representatives under the Prisoner of War Convention are appointed in one of the following
ways: (1) if the detainment camp consists solely of officers or a mix of officers and non-officers, the
“senior officer among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners’ representative”; or
(2) if there are no officers among the POWs, “the prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot, every six
months, and also in case of vacancies, prisoners’ representatives.” GPW, supra note 17, at art. 79. The duty
of the prisoner representatives is to “represent[] [prisoners] before the military authorities, the Protecting
Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization which may assist
them,” and to ensure that the representative actually represents the interests of the relevant group, a
prisoner representative must “have the same nationality, language and customs as the prisoners of war
whom he represents.” Id.
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See Geoffrey S. Corn, Enemy Combatants and Access to Habeas Corpus: Questioning the Validity of the

Prisoner of War Analogy, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 236, 249 (2007). The relevant portion of this article
discusses the process for POW determination: POW determinations under the Prisoner of War
Convention are made pursuant to an Article 5 tribunal applying the POW status qualification criteria
established by Article 4, but Article 4 is itself unreachable unless Article 2 applies to the armed conflict in
which the individual was captured. See id. See also GPW, supra note 17, at art. 2 (“the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”) (emphasis
added). As the author describes, Article 2 applicability—the predicate requirement for applying Article 4
POW criteria at an Article 5 status tribunal, and the predicate for even requiring such a tribunal in the
first place—requires an “inter-state dispute[] involving the intervention of armed forces. Accordingly,
Article 4 is never applicable in any other kind of armed conflict.” Corn, supra note 166, at 248 (citations
omitted). As the author noted, the fact that the United States is not in an armed conflict with another
sovereign nation, but instead is combating a transnational non-state entity,
is the principal basis for the United States’ determination that captured al Qaeda warriors
are conclusively presumed to be excluded from POW status. Although the armed conflict
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unprivileged belligerent do share the common consequences of their belligerency and
capture: preventive detention for the duration of hostilities. However, beyond this the
analogy between these two categories of wartime detainees dissipates. POW status is
defined by treaty, and therefore the procedural protections established by the GPW for
POWs are premised on the underlying assumption that the individuals accorded those
protections fall into a clearly defined category. As a result, these protections are not
focused primarily on resolving the complex question of whether a captive should or
should not be subjected to preventive detention, but instead on ensuring that the rights
established by the treaty are respected by the detaining power. Even Article 5 of the
GPW – the only provision of the treaty addressing a status determination procedure –
reflects this reality. The function of the Article 5 tribunal is to merely apply the
established Article 4 status qualification criterion.162 As a result, it is intended to be a
that the United States asserts exists between this transnational organization and the
United States is international in scope, there is not even a credible argument that al
Qaeda satisfies the requirements necessary to be considered a state. While it is plausible
that such personnel might have been associated with the armed conflict between the
United States and Afghanistan during the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom,
so long as the United States persists in treating the armed conflict with al Qaeda as
distinct from armed conflicts with sponsoring states, the predicate requirement of “right
kind of conflict” cannot be satisfied. Accordingly, personnel captured in association with
this armed conflict do not benefit from the provision of the Prisoner of War Convention.
Assuming, however, that the initial “right kind of conflict” requirement is satisfied, the
second requirement that individuals captured during such a conflict meet the Article 4
POW qualification criteria, or that the individual detainee is the “right kind of person,”
still must be met.
Id. at 248–50 (citations omitted). The author continues in asserting that Article 4 criteria have not be met
by al Qaeda forces in the past, because their organization, lack of a fixed distinctive sign or emblem,
failure to openly carry arms and, arguably most important, disregard for conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war, prevent such warriors from being classified as POWs
under the Third Geneva Convention. See id. at 250–52. See also GPW, supra note 17, at art. 4 (setting forth
criteria which, if met and proved at an Article 5 hearing, require a captured individual to continue to
receive POW status).
162

The Prisoner of War Convention defines the following individuals as POWs:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and . . . other volunteer corps . . . provided that such
[organizations] fulfill the conditions of . . . being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates . . . having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance . . . carrying
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summary, non-adversarial process. The role of the prisoner’s representative is therefore
not to serve as an advocate for the detainee subjected to the status determination, but
instead to monitor the proceeding in order to facilitate raising concerns about the
process to the Protecting Power – the entity responsible for monitoring compliance with
the treaty and bringing alleged violations to the attention of the detaining power.163
Beyond the analogous preventive detention consequence of their belligerency,
the situation of an unprivileged belligerent is fundamentally distinct from that of a
POW. Unlike the POW, there is no internationally accepted definition of this status, and
certainly no treaty based definition.164 In fact, it is unclear whether consensus on such a

arms openly . . . [and] conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces professing allegiance to a government or an
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof . . .
provided they have received authorization[] from the armed forces which they
accompany . . .
(5) Members of crews . . . of the merchant marine and . . . civil aircraft of the Parties to the
conflict . . .
(6) Inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having time to form
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the
laws and customs of war.
GPW, supra note 17, at art. 4(A). Two other classifications of individuals are also treated as POWs. See id.
at art. 4(B).
163

See id. at art. 79, 80 (“[P]risoners’ representatives [are] entrusted with representing [the prisoners they

represent] before the military authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red
Cross and any other organization which may assist them”; “[p]risoners’ representatives shall further the
physical, spiritual and intellectual well-being of prisoners of war”).
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See David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001,

1032–33 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court noted the internationally-accepted distinctions
between lawful and unlawful combatants in Quirin and recognized spies and saboteurs as combatants
typically ineligible for POW status, and further considering that the Supreme Court in Hamdi “observed
that there is disagreement about the appropriate scope of the term ‘enemy combatant,’ and noted that ‘the
government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as
such.’” However, despite the Hamdi court accepting an “as-applied” definition of “enemy combatant” for
Hamdi and Congress broadly defining “enemy combatant” in the MCA, there has been no international
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definition even exists between the three branches of the U.S. government. From the
inception of the U.S. war on terror preventive detention practice, the definition of who
may properly be subjected to preventive detention has vexed the government.165 At the
consensus on “the precise boundary between combatants and civilians . . . in the present context of
terrorism and asymmetrical warfare”) (citations omitted).
165

See WITTES, supra note 49, at 16–17. The positions of the Bush and Obama Administration positions are

somewhat different, but arguably the Obama Administration’s decision to cease justifying detention
authority on inherent Article II powers is, in part, due to the courts’ unwillingness to recognize inherent
Article II detention powers broader than the powers described by the AUMF:
The Bush administration asserted that both Article II of the Constitution and the
September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) gave it the power
to detain for the duration of hostilities both members and supporters of entities—
including Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and “associated forces”—that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its allies. The Supreme Court partially upheld this claim in
Hamdi. A plurality of the Court determined in that case that the AUMF implicitly
conferred the “traditional incidents” of lawful warfare on American operations, that
these incidents included the power to detain enemy fighters in at least some
circumstances, and that this authority would apply at least to a person who bore arms for
the Taliban in Afghanistan. This holding obviously left open the question of whether the
AUMF (or Article II, for that matter) similarly provided for such non-criminal detention
of persons captured in other circumstances. Less obviously, it also left open a set of
difficult issues concerning what it means to be a “member” or “part” of any of these
organizations, at least some of which are better characterized as loose associational
networks than as hierarchical organizations . . . In March 2009, however, the Obama
administration filed a brief in the Hamlily habeas litigation that departed only in three
relatively-minor ways from the Bush administration’s earlier approach. First, the new
administration asserted that henceforth its claim to detention authority would rest on the
AUMF, rather than on any claim of inherent Article II power, and that its AUMF-based
authority ought to be construed in accordance with the laws of war. Second, the Obama
administration dropped the label “enemy combatant” in favor of the less provocative
practice of referring simply to persons detainable pursuant to the AUMF. These moves,
notably, have not generated particular controversy among the district court judges.
Those who have explicitly addressed the source-of-authority issue appear to accept that
the proper frame of reference is indeed the AUMF. And no judge thus far has suggested
that the government may have broader authority by virtue of any inherent Article II
arguments. Nor has any expressed doubt that the AUMF provides at least some form of
detention authority.
Id. (citations omitted).
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outset, the definition adopted by the President was similar to the ”you know it when
you see it” definition of pornography. For individuals subjected to detention in the
early months of the Global War on Terror, the definition was in effect ”you know it
when President Bush sees it.” The Department of Defense then adopted its own
definition when it established the CSRT.166 Subsequently, Congress adopted a slightly
different definition by implication when it defined who could be subjected to trial by
military commission as the result of being an unlawful enemy combatant.167 In addition
to these various definitions, the judiciary has developed its own definition for purpose
of habeas corpus litigation.168 None of these definitions, however, reflect the clarity of
166

See generally CSRT Order, supra note 82 (establishing the procedure of the CSRT hearing and the

qualifications, roles, and responsibilities of the hearing officers, reporter, detainee personal
representative, and outlining the manner in which the detainee could participate in the CSRT process).
167
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See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, (2006); 10 U. S. C. § 948d (2009).
See WITTES, supra note 49, at 17–21. As noted in the article, there are up to four distinct judicial

definitions of detainability, three of which have been espoused by District Court judges and one of which
was presented by the D.C. Court of Appeals. The most widely-accepted detainment position is based on
Hamlily and, summarized, states that while the “AUMF confers authority on the executive branch to
detain members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces . . . independent support—even if
substantial—[cannot] provide a distinct ground for detention.” Id. at 18 (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.
Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009)). However, the judge in Hamlily emphasized “that there are ‘no settled criteria’
for identifying formal membership in Al Qaeda” and thus “courts must be open to proof of functional
membership.” Id. (quoting Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75–76. The judge in Hamlily thus noted that “[t]he
‘key inquiry,’ in all events, is ‘whether the individual functions or participates within or under the
command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he receives and executes orders or directions.’” Id.
(quoting Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75). This position has received the most support among the district
judges in the D.C. Circuit, but other judges have reinterpreted even this “most widely-accepted”
definition. To summarize the Hamlily definition and describe a reinterpretation:
Hamlily . . . precludes detention of entirely-independent actors who happen to provide
support to Al Qaeda, but it considers acts of support to be relevant evidence of functional
membership as long as the government can establish an element of direction and control
in the relationship between the group and the individual. Subsequently, at least four
other judges—Hogan, Robertson, Kollar-Kotelly, and Lamberth—have expressly adopted
this interpretation. A fifth judge—Urbina—likewise has expressly adopted the Hamlily
definition, but his actual application of the test suggests that he may have in mind
something more restrictive than the other judges. In Hatim v. Obama, Judge Ricardo
Urbina adopts the Hamlily standard but then goes on to address the sufficiency of the
government’s attempt to satisfy that standard by proving that the detainee had attended
Al Qaeda’s Al Farouq training camp. In that context, he states that even if the

64

government could prove that the petitioner attended that camp and that he understood
that he thereby became part of the “al-Qaida apparatus,” the government’s burden
would still require it to present evidence to the effect that he had actually received and
executed orders from Al Qaeda and thereby “participated” in its command structure,
rather than simply received its training. It may be that the other judges subscribing to
Hamlily would take the same view, but it seems more likely that this entails a degree of
engagement beyond what most or all of them have in mind under the heading of
functional membership.
WITTES, supra note 49, at 17–18 (quoting Hatim v. Obama, No. 05-1429, slip op. at 19–20 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
2009)). The second definitional position, from Gherebi, tracks the Administration’s support for the notion
that “either membership or substantial support can trigger detention authority” but that the authority
“’encompass[es] only individuals who were members of the enemy organization’s armed forces, as that
term is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their capture.’” WITTES, supra note 49, at 19 (quoting
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2009)). The article notes that
[w]hether this approach truly differs from the Hamlily approach depends, of course, on
whether one thinks that the concept of membership under the laws of war would
encompass the “functional membership” scenario.
WITTES, supra note 49, at 19. The third position, first expressed in the Boumediene case on remand from the
Supreme Court, is simply Judge Leon’s express adoption of the Bush Administration’s detainability
definition, which allows detainment of “both members and supporters of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces.” WITTES, supra note 49, at 20 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135–36
(D.D.C. 2008)). However, when presented with the Obama Administration’s more limited definition,
Judge Leon has yet to “subsequently confront[] a petition that would require him to accept or reject the
government’s continuing claim of authority to detain on grounds of support alone”; Judge Leon even
appeared to “express[] some degree of impatience with the effort by the Obama administration to narrow
modestly the scope of its detention authority.” WITTES, supra note 49, at 20 (quoting Al Ginco v. Obama,
626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D.D.C. 2009)). Finally, the fourth position, first presented by a 2-1 panel of the
D.C. Circuit in Al Bihani, “construes the AUMF to support not just the narrower support ground the
Obama administration favors, but also the original Bush administration variant—in which support did
not necessarily have to qualify as substantial” in order for the support to justify detention. WITTES, supra
note 49, at 20 (citing Al Bihani v. Obama, No. 09-5051, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 5, 2010)). While the
petitioner argued that an interpretation of the AUMF allowing for military commission trials and
detainment of persons materially supporting hostilities stands in conflict with the detention authority of
the law of armed conflict, the majority stated that the law of armed conflict was “’not a source of
authority for U.S. courts’ and cannot be construed ‘as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s
war powers under the AUMF.’” WITTES, supra note 49, at 21 (citing Al Bihani, No. 09-5051, slip op. at 8–
9).
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the Article 4 POW definition.169 Terms like “materially” or “substantially” supported
involve a high degree of subjective interpretation, and the scope of detention authority
continues to this day to be an area of uncertainty.
This definitional uncertainty undermines the legitimacy of a broad-based
analogy to the GPW when assessing the extent of procedural protections that should be
provided to unprivileged belligerent detainees. For these detainees belligerent status
determinations involve far more complexity than the determination of prisoner of war
status. As noted above, the standard pursuant to which they will be detained is less
clear than that applicable to POWs. This in turn leads to a very different evidentiary
equation. For individuals brought before an Article 5 tribunal to determine whether
they qualify as POWs, the evidentiary focus is almost exclusively on indicia of
connection to a defined enemy armed force.170 Thus, it is information related to
uniform, equipment, and capture in the proximity of clearly identified enemy personnel
that provides significant probative value. In contrast, the evidentiary focus for
determining unprivileged belligerent status is often much more nuanced. Information
related to associations, activities, and state of mind is normally far more significant than
uniform or other traditional indicia of belligerent status. As a result, simply extending
the procedural construct of the GPW - or and more specifically of the Article 5 tribunal to status determinations that will result in indefinite detention of unprivileged enemy
belligerents is both unjustified and inefficient. Instead, as reflected by the lessons
learned in the decade since the U.S. began detaining individuals based on this status, a
hybrid process is needed to balance the legitimate interests of preventive detention with
the equally legitimate liberty interest of individuals improperly swept up in an
overzealous point of capture detention effort.

See generally GPW, supra note 17, at art. 4 (specifically defining categories of persons to be considered

169

prisoners of war and thus protected under the Third Geneva Convention).
An Article 5 hearing under the Third Convention occurs solely to determine whether any of the Article

170

4 definitions apply to the subject of the hearing; if one does not, the subject should not be considered a
POW and will not be protected by the Third Convention. See id. Note that under Article 5, a detaining
Power must presume that and act as if a captured belligerent qualifies as a POW protected by the Third
Convention unless and until the Article 5 tribunal finds otherwise (i.e. that the individual does not fit into
any Article 4 category). See id. (“persons . . . [who] hav[e] committed a belligerent act and hav[e] fallen
into the hands of the enemy . . . shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as
their status [under Article 4] has been determined . . . ”).
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This lesson has recently been manifested in the U.S. revision of the detention
review process in Parwan, Afghanistan. As a work in progress, this effort has produced
a substantial improvement in the overall detention operation in Afghanistan. As will be
summarized in the next section, these revisions established a quasi-adversarial process
and recognize the importance of providing detainees with representation in that
process. However, the individuals assigned with this responsibility are not lawyers, but
instead lay U.S. military officers, calling into question the effectiveness of the overall
revision effort.
b. Questioning the Efficacy of Non-Legal Representation
Referencing Supreme Court right to counsel jurisprudence in no way suggests
that the author’s propose extending that right to unprivileged enemy belligerents. Such
a proposal would ignore the unquestionable fact that only initiation of formal
adversarial criminal process triggers that right, a trigger not implicated by preventive
wartime detentions and unaffected by detainee nationality. Instead, this reference is
intended to highlight an underlying tenet of this jurisprudence: the indelible link
between protecting individuals facing the risk of a deprivation of liberty and the lawyer
ethos of zealous representation. That risk permeates the punitive and preventive
detention process, a risk that justifies questioning the wisdom of limiting legal
representation to only one of these contexts.
The Supreme Court’s right to counsel cases reveal two important principles: first,
lawyers, by virtue of their ethical obligation and professional culture, possess a unique
capacity to zealously represent even the most reviled objects of societal scorn; second,
bringing that zealousness to bear is essential to protect the interests of individuals
subjected to confinement.171 While our legal culture normally associates such
171

See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Supreme Court discussed how the opportunity for a

defendant o be heard is meaningless without the opportunity to be represented by a person trained in the
law, and that such a denial amounts to a denial of constitutionally-mandated due process:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally,
of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
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confinement with the criminal process, recent decisions of the Court have extended the
requirement of zealous legal representation beyond that context to situations of
preventive non-punitive detention.172
These two vectors – a limited trigger for the right to counsel and the significance
of liberty interest implicated by any form of confinement - create a gray area for any
meaningful analysis of the protections that should be afforded to individuals subject to
wartime preventive detention as unprivileged belligerents. Wartime captives have not
historically been provided legal representation in the detention determination process.
Instead, as noted earlier in this article, assistance has traditionally come in the form of a
lay prisoner’s representative. This history arguably supports the practice of providing
lay representation for detainees. However, the consequence of the status determination
made by the review tribunals established to assess detainability of alleged unprivileged
belligerents clearly implicates the same concerns implicated by the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, and the extension of that right to the non-punitive detention processes
the Supreme Court has recently endorsed. In fact, the consequence of a wartime
detention decision is potentially more profound than that related to punitive
incarceration.173 Unlike the criminal context, the detention of unprivileged belligerents
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil of criminal, a state or federal
court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing
for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a
hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.
Id. at 68–69.
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See, e.g,. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742, 751–52 (1987) (holding constitutional the 1984 Bail

Reform Act’s provisions regarding pretrial preventive detention, in part because of the Act’s procedural
safeguards, including a right to counsel at the administrative detention hearing); United States v.
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (holding constitutional the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act, which in part authorizes a federal district court to order the civil commitment of a mentally ill
and sexually-dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released from
incarceration; the statute provides that at the commitment hearing, the prisoner “’shall be represented by
counsel.’” Id. (citations omitted)).
173

See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (discussing the process due under a CSRT and stating that

“[a]lthough we make no judgment whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process
standards, we agree . . . that, even when all the parties involved in this process act with diligence and in
good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact”).
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in is not for a defined period, but is as close to indefinite detention as in any other
imaginable context.174
It is clear that this perceived consequence of indefinite detention was a
significant motivation for the important and credible revisions to the detention review
process implemented to date. It is equally clear that Congress has recognized the
importance of legal representation for individuals subjected to this process.
Collectively, these developments confirm that individual representation is an important
component in mitigating the risk of erroneous status determinations, thereby increasing
the probability of factually justified detention decisions. What is less clear is whether
the consequence of relying on non-lawyers to provide this representation has been
adequately assessed or critiqued.175 Ultimately, the shift away from the lay
representative model reflected in the NDAA implicates potentially significant
cost/benefit considerations. It is to these considerations the article will now turn.
c. The Potential Benefits of Legal Representation
Lawyers play a unique role in any adversarial or quasi-adversarial process. In
many ways, that role mirrors the role of the soldier on the field of battle. Both the
soldier and the lawyer are inculcated with an ethos of aggressive execution of the
mission. For the soldier, this is reflected in the values of duty and selfless-service. For
the lawyer, it is reflected in the ethical duty of zealousness. Irrespective of the label
placed on the duty, the effect is the same. Both the soldier and the lawyer perform their
duties on behalf of a ‘client’; both the soldier and the lawyer are expected to execute
their duties tirelessly and aggressively within the limits of the rules that regulate their
respective battles; and both the soldier and the lawyer understand that it is not their
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See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (“If the Government does not consider this

unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if
released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken throughout the
litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his life”).
175

See id. at 767, 787 (noting that a detainee’s personal representative is not a lawyer and explicitly not

even a lay advocate, and while discussing how General Yamashita and the defendants in Quirin were
provided with legal representation, also stating that those proceedings were adversarial in nature, where
Boumediene’s CSRT was considered an administrative proceeding, not an adversarial proceeding).
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role to question of the mission assigned by the client, but instead to fight within the
limits of the rules to accomplish that mission.176
This last aspect of the analogy between the soldier and the lawyer is perhaps
most significant to truly understand the importance of the zealous representation ethos.
Lawyers possess a unique ability to embrace their duty on behalf the most vilified
objects of state action.177 Exemplified by the likes of John Adams,178 Sam Leibowitz179
and Kenneth Royall,180 this ability is central to the credibility of the adversarial process.
176

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2. Rule 1.2 concerns the scope of representation and

demarcates the sharing of authority between the attorney and client:
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation
and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.
In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client
will testify.
Id. at 1.2(a). A common axiom is that the client makes strategic decisions (i.e. what plea to enter) while the
lawyer makes tactical decisions (i.e. determining the order of witnesses called, deciding what evidence to
offer). However, this is not entirely accurate, as the lawyer’s tactical decision-making is tempered by the
client’s overall strategic control (i.e. the client may tell the lawyer not to call a certain witness or not to
offer certain evidence; the lawyer must abide by these decisions).
177

This acceptance of duty is sometimes codified into Rules of Professional Conduct, perhaps in part to

remind lawyers that no matter their personal disagreements with their clients’ lifestyles, that everyone is
entitled to zealous representation. See, e.g., AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2005) (“A
lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an
endorsement of the client’s economic, social, or moral views or activities”).
178

See supra note 12.
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See supra note 13

180

Kenneth Claiborne Royall was a colonel in the United States Army during World War II. In 1942, he

was appointed by President Roosevelt to defend the Nazis captured during Operation Pastorius – also
known as the defendants in Ex parte Quirin. Though Royall was ordered to defend the Nazis before a
military tribunal, he believed that the President did not have the authority to convene a secret military
court to try his clients, and appealed to the federal courts, arguing that the military commission was
unconstitutional. Royall represented the defendants at the Supreme Court, and though the Court held in
favor of the President’s order, he had succeeded in obtaining independent civilian judicial review for his
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The defense bar prides itself on its unapologetic commitment to individuals who
although legally presumed innocent are often obviously factually guilty. Accepting the
approbation of the public – a public that is often incapable of truly understanding either
the nature of the lawyer’s duty or its contribution to legitimacy – is an integral part of
their obligation. Lawyers understand that without that zealous commitment to the
client the adversarial system cannot properly function, and as the Supreme Court
reminds us periodically, the distortion produced by an absence of such representation
fundamentally undermines the entire concept of justice.181
Ensuring a balanced adversarial process that produces a credible result therefore
requires more than merely competing representatives; it requires representatives fully
committed to the adversarial competition. The assumption that lay representatives are
capable of such commitment is highly questionable in the abstract, and even more so in
the context of a review process charged with determining whether to release an
individual alleged to be an enemy belligerent. In the abstract, asking a lay-person to
embrace the cause of target of state accusation – even in relation to a non-punitive
allegation – is inconsistent with the normal assumption that accusation suggests guilt
(that this assumption is normal is reflected in the universal admonition to jurors in

clients. Royall later served as the last Secretary of War in 1947, and then as the first Secretary of the Army
until 1949. See Nathan Williams, What Happened to the 8 Germans Tried by a Military Court in World War II,
HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (July 8, 2002), http://hnn.us/articles/431.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012); Kenneth
Claiborne Royall, U.S. ARMY, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Sw-SA/Royall.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2012). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
181

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that “the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial” and noting that “the
Court has recognized that ‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel’”)
(citations omitted). In its jurisprudence, the Court has enumerated the requirements for a fair trial and
repeatedly emphasized that, with regard to the right to counsel,
a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an
impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The right
to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth
Amendment, since access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord
defendants the “ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution” to which they
are entitled.
Id. at 685.
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criminal cases that they may not consider the accusation of a defendant as evidence of
guilt).182 In the detainee status context, the difficulty is exponentially increased.
Zealous representation of detainees by lay military officers requires commitment
to protect the interests of an alleged enemy operative. This in itself is problematic. How
can a member of the U.S. armed forces be expected to embrace the interests of an
individual captured by his colleagues and detained based on an initial determination of
belligerent conduct?183 It is difficult to imagine a more unattractive ‘client’. Exacerbating
this problem are the obvious stakes implicated by the outcome of the review process. It
is entirely unrealistic to expect the representative to ignore the possibility that
effectively performing the representation duties could result in an enemy operative
being returned to the battle-space. The obvious consequence of such an outcome would
include the death or injury of other members of U.S. or coalition armed forces. It is far
more realistic to assume that these considerations will inevitably compromise the
representative zeal essential to effectuate the purpose of the quasi-adversarial process.
It is unlikely the Department of Defense was ignorant to this risk when it
developed the detainee review process for both Guantanamo and Parwan. Instead, it is
far more likely that the decision to rely on lay representatives was based on three
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See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 289 (1981) (holding that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury

that “[t]he defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an
inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way” was fundamental error and that a defendant
had a right to such an instruction under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Court noted that
while “[n]o judge can prevent jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands mute in the face of a
criminal accusation,” a judge must, at the defendant’s request, “use the unique power of the jury
instruction to reduce that speculation to a minimum” and that “the failure to limit the jurors” speculation
on the meaning of . . . [a defendant’s] silence, when the defendant makes a timely request that a
prophylactic instruction be given, exacts an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege
[against self-incrimination].” Id. at 303, 305.
183

See David J.R. Frakt, The Myth of Divided Loyalties: Defending Detainees and the Constitution in the

Guantanamo Military Commissions, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 545, 554 (2011) (“Contrary to what some nonlawyers might believe, there is no conflict of interest for a military lawyer in representing an individual
whose interests may be, in some sense, adverse to the U.S. government or the U.S. military, at least as
defined by the rules of professional responsibility”). Obviously, legal training emphasizes the nature of
zealous representation, even of a client one might find personally abhorrent; unfortunately, lay
representatives are not steeped in the sort of training and ethos as lawyers are, potentially resulting in the
internal conflict described above.
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primary considerations. First, analogy to the GPW Article 5 process almost certainly
influenced this decision. As noted earlier, on the surface the objective of both the CSRTs
and the Article 5 are analogous. Accordingly, it is somewhat logical that those
responsible for developing the CSRT process would adopt the Article 5 model.
However, as was also explained earlier, because analogy between the POW and the
unprivileged belligerent is limited, this assumption cannot justify a wholesale
importation of Article 5 process for the unlawful belligerent detention determination.
Second, it is likely that reliance on lay representatives was based in part on the
assumption that tactical and technical proficiency is the sine qua non of effective
representation. This assumption is supported by the efforts devoted to training these
representatives.184 This is a flawed assumption. Effective representation of individuals
accused of conduct so contrary to the interests of the state that it warrants incarceration
– either punitive or preventive – requires more than tactical or technical proficiency in
the process established to make the detention determination. The true sine qua non is the
far more intangible element of zealousness. As noted earlier, this clearly forms the
foundation of the Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence, and is central to the
ethical obligation of lawyers. To suggest that expertise in the process alone renders
representation of such an individual truly effective is inconsistent with this American
representation tradition.185
Of course, it is virtually impossible to prove this premise with anything close to
empirical certitude. However, several considerations provide inferential support. First,
consider the analogy to the soldier. Like the lawyer, tactical and technical proficiency is
essential to the effectiveness of the soldier. However, military leaders understand
intuitively that this is not the key element in producing a truly effective soldier, an
individual who has been transformed from ‘civilian’ into ‘soldier’. This transformation
involves far more than the development of tactical and technical proficiency; it involves
184

See Bovarnick, supra note 98, at 20 n. 82, 30 (discussing the initial training and periodic refresher

training requirements of board members, recorders, and personal representatives).
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See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel and holding that “a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to
an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.” Further, the Court
reinforced the notion that access to legal representation “plays a crucial role in the adversarial system
embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord
defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution’ to which they are entitled”)
(citation omitted).
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inculcating the recruit with the warrior ethos and the value set that defines military
service. This is a major component not only of initial training, but also of a soldier’s
entire professional development. This is what accounts for the transformation from
individual to member of a team committed to mission accomplishment. Soldiers are
immersed in a culture of duty, loyalty, selfless service, and the sense of pride in being
part of an organization that places mission accomplishment above self-interest.186
Without that intangible element, the transformation is fundamentally incomplete.
This analogy is indeed ironic in the context of the detainee representation
process. The Department of Defense has essentially adopted an approach to this process
that is inconsistent with its own understanding of the relationship between tactical and
technical proficiency and professional ethos. Taking the analogy to its logical
conclusion, reliance on lay advocates to represent suspected unprivileged enemy
belligerents in the detention review process is analogous to reliance on an experienced
hunter to perform the mission of an infantryman on the field of battle. Such a
suggestion is of course ludicrous. However, it reveals the significance of professional
ethos in relation to the execution of the challenging duty entrusted to the warrior. In the
adversarial system, it is the advocate who serves as the warrior; and in that system the
significance of professional ethos is no less profound.
The third consideration that likely contributed to the lay representative approach
is feasibility. A simplistic assessment of the cost/benefit equation might suggest that
providing lay representation for suspected unlawful enemy belligerents is logical. The
numbers and availability of non-legal military officers capable of being trained in
representation duties is obviously more extensive than available military legal
officers.187 Judge Advocates are a finite resource already involved in the support of
186

The culture is reflected in the core values of each service: while each service phrases its values slightly

differently, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all list some form of honor/integrity, selfless
service, courage, and committing to excellence as core values. See generally U.S. Army, Living the Army
Values, available at http://www.goarmy.com/soldier-life/being-a-soldier/living-the-army-values.html
(last
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Navy,
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available
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http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=193 (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); U.S. Air Force, Our
Values, available at http://www.airforce.com/learn-about/our-values/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); U.S.
Marine

Corps,

Core

Values,

available

at

http://www.marines.com/main/index/making_marines/culture/traditions/core_values (last visited Sept. 9,
2011).
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For example, as of 2009, there were 88,093 officers in the United States Army; of those, only about 2000

individuals were full-time judge-advocates. Compare United States Armed Forces, Wikipedia (Jan. 6, 2012 at
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military operations in unprecedented numbers. Providing a military lawyer for every
captive facing indefinite detention hearing would create an additional burden on this
finite pool of military lawyers. If the focal point of satisfying the representation
requirement is technical aptitude, then the availability of an alternate source of officers
to perform these duties would seem an attractive and logical alternative.
Even assuming arguendo that technical competence is the appropriate focal point
of cost/benefit analysis (an assumption challenged throughout this article) there are
three other considerations that undermine a balance that favors continuation of the lay
representative approach. First, the second order benefit to the habeas litigation process.
Second, the overall enhanced credibility of the U.S. detention process. Third, enhanced
efficiency in the process to determine who should continue to be detained. Each of these
considerations favor representation by individuals imbued with the legal professional
ethos. This conclusion is based on the assumption that legal representation would
improve the quality of the detention review process by producing more comprehensive
review tribunal records and mitigating the risk of detaining individuals without
legitimate cause, a conclusion that apparently motivated Congress to impose this
requirement on the Department of Defense.188
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PM),

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Armed_Forces#Personnel_in_each_service

(reporting the number of officers in the Army in 2009) (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) with Judge-Advocate
2011,

4:47

PM),

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judge_Advocate_General%27s_Corps,_United_States_Army

(last

visited

General’s

Corps,

United

States

Army,

WIKIPEDIA

(Sept.

19,

Jan. 8, 2012) (reporting the number of JAG officers).
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Just as appointed JAG defense attorneys pointed out flaws with the military commission trials under

the 2006 MCA, so would legal counsel be able to note the flaws of the CSRT process and move to
challenge them. See Frakt, supra note 104, at 563 (“The efforts of both military defense counsel and
prosecutors highlighted the many flaws of the MCA of 2006. This, in turn, led to dramatic improvements
in the MCA of 2009”). Frakt, himself a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force Reserve JAG Corps, also
notes that in his experience, JAG attorneys do not feel as if representing detainees is harming their
country; rather, many see it as a way to defend the Constitution and American values:
The ultimate allegiance of the military lawyer is to the U.S. Constitution. Military
defenders not only saw no conflict with their oath to defend the Constitution, but viewed
the representation of detainees as being in total harmony with this duty. Military lawyers
are also deeply committed to the laws of war and the rule of law generally. The
substantive law of the military commission, as well as the rules and procedures
developed by the Pentagon, were inconsistent with the laws of war and violated basic
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The first of these considerations – the impact on the habeas litigation process –
could produce two important benefits. First, it is logical to assume that representation
by a skilled lawyer will enhance the review tribunal quasi-adversarial process. These
improvements could include exposing evidentiary deficiencies, identifying and
presenting otherwise overlooked probative evidence, subjecting presented evidence to
more robust testing, and more effectively summarizing the evidence and legal
standards applicable to the decision-maker. This enhancement will in turn result in a
more comprehensive record of the status determination process. If and when these
determinations are subject to federal judicial review, the enhanced quality of these
records should logically result in enhanced reliance on the detainability determination
by reviewing courts.189 The importance of this potential benefit is highlighted by the
government’s habeas litigation track record to date. After Boumediene opened the door
to consideration of evidentiary insufficiency, this factor became a major focal point of
reviewing courts.190 Improved representation should mitigate this problem. Of course,
principles of due process. Many JAGs viewed the entire legal regime as an affront to
military justice and to basic American values and were eager to reveal its shortcomings.
Id. at 558.
189

See id. at 555 (noting that CSRT findings “were largely discounted by defense attorneys . . . [as] [t]he

Tribunals were viewed as unfair and deeply flawed”); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(rejecting the Government’s contention that “it can prevail by submitting documents that read as if they
were indictments or civil complaints, and that simply assert as facts the elements required to prove that a
detainee falls within the definition of enemy combatant” and requiring the government to demonstrate
the reliability of its evidence).
190

See WITTES, supra note 49, at 77–80. Two of the major evidentiary issues are hearsay and so-called

“mosaic evidence” – primarily circumstantial evidence that the Government claims should be considered
as a whole, as opposed to judicial consideration of each individual piece of evidence by itself. With
regard to hearsay:
[b]oth government and habeas counsel are also pushing the appeals courts to redirect the
lower court concerning the use of hearsay evidence, with a particular focus on the
admissibility of and weight to be accorded such evidence . . . In Al Adahi, the government
argues that Judge Kessler flyspecked its evidence way too closely, looking at each piece
of evidence individually and applying scrutiny to it that, “far from acknowledging the
realities of the wartime military setting and the weight and sensitivity of the
government’s interests. . . [applied a] heightened standard of proof for the government.”
In one instance, the government argues, Judge Kessler “searched for reasons, including
mistaken reasons, to discredit the government’s witness, and refused on legally
erroneous grounds to even consider the evidence that corroborated the witness’s
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the value of this benefit is at this point in time restricted to the Guantanamo CSRTs.
Whether habeas review will ultimately be extended to other detention venues like
Afghanistan is yet to be determined conclusively.191 This improved process could,
however, reduce the risk of such extension in the future by providing important indicia
of credibility to the existing Executive branch approach to assessing detainability.
Even assuming habeas review is never extended beyond Guantanamo detainees,
improving the quality of other detention review proceedings will enhance the
credibility of the overall detention process for unprivileged belligerents. Although the
primary focal point of criticism of the U.S. detention practices since September 11th has
been maltreatment of detainees (an issue that arose early in the war on terror and is
now widely considered to have been mooted by U.S. recognition of a universal humane
treatment obligation for all detainees), an important an underlying criticism has always
been the prima facie illegitimacy of detention outside the framework of the Geneva
Prisoner of War and Civilian Conventions.192 While there is substantial dispute on the

statements.” The proper approach, it urges the D.C. Circuit, “is to recognize the distinct
nature of the intelligence information and other sources on which the military must rely,
and to accord appropriate deference to the inferences that expert military personnel draw
from such material based on the insights they derive from their military operations and
experience.
Id. at 77 (citations omitted).
191

Although the District of Columbia District Court extended habeas review to a detainee held in Bagram

who had been initially captured outside of Afghanistan, this decision was subsequently reversed by the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that district
court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ writs of habeas corpus, as petitioners were held outside
the de jure sovereignty of the United States and thus previous statutory invocations of the Article I,
Section 9 Suspension Clause served to deny the district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ habeas
petitions). This indicates it is unlikely the courts will extend habeas review beyond the limits of
Guantanamo detainees. However, as with so many other issue related to detentions of unprivileged
belligerents in the war on terror, it is truly impossible to predict how this issue will ultimately evolve.
192

See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists and Permanent Emergency, 25 T.

JEFFERSON L. REV. 389, 389 (2003). Lobel argues that detaining against future conduct rather than
punished past offenses “threatens to undermine fundamental principles of both constitutional law and
international law which prohibit certain government action based on mere suspicion or perceived threat”
and is especially concerned about such detention being employed against U.S. citizens, and draws strong
historical parallels when arguing that
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[t]he use of indefinite administrative detention against citizens for security purposes
represents a profound shift in our constitutional order which generally prohibits
detaining people for substantial period without charging them with a crime. Despite the
Constitution's proscriptions, the American government has responded to perceived or
contrived security threats in the past by detaining or authorizing the detention of
disfavored groups: anarchist aliens during the Palmer Raids after WWI, Japanese
Americans during WWII, suspected communists during the Cold War, and now
suspected terrorists labeled as “enemy combatants.”
Id. at 397–98. See also Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent; How to Understand the Law
Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It should be Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 810–11. Walen adopts a moral or principled approach, rather than pragmatic
approach, to the issue of long-term detention, asserting that
one might respond to the claim that the government can prosecute suspected terrorists
(STs) who threaten to commit terrorist acts by saying that that option, helpful as it might
be, is not as helpful as also having the option of subjecting STs to long-term preventive
detention (LTPD). I have argued at length against that position, and in favor of the view
that respect for the dignity of autonomous individuals requires the government to release
and police, after (at most) a short period of preventive detention, its own citizens who it
cannot convict of a crime for which long-term punitive detention is a fitting punishment.
Id. (citations omitted). Walen’s position revolves around the dichotomy of short-term detention and
observation followed by prosecution or release and further observation, and in all instances, long-term
detention is inappropriate unless and until the suspect is actually convicted of a crime. Walen makes
stark distinctions between what he considers to be justifiable short-term detention (which, if applied
against a citizen may arguably still violate their constitutional right to liberty) and long-term detention,
which is only justifiable in a punitive context or very specific preventive contexts; however, at no time
does he believe that long-term preventive detention for alleged terrorist operatives is appropriate for
future intelligence-gathering purposes:
Those who can be detained fall into two basic categories: those subject to punitive
detention and those subject to preventive detention. Punitive detention respects
autonomy because it is based on a person's autonomous choice to commit a crime. Those
subject to preventive detention can be detained in the short-term for the sake of security
because even innocent people can be expected to make small sacrifices for the sake of the
greater welfare. People may be subject to long-term preventive detention (“LTPD”),
however, only if they fall into one of four categories: (1) they lack the normal
autonomous capacity to govern their own choices; (2) they have, in virtue of one or more
criminal convictions, lost their right to be treated as autonomous and accountable; (3)
they have an independent duty to avoid contact with others because such contact would
be impermissibly harmful (e.g., those with contagious and deadly diseases), and LTPD
simply reinforces this duty; or (4) they are incapable of being adequately policed and
held accountable for their choices. Importantly, traditional combatants and some
suspected members of groups like al-Qaeda fall under this last category, and thus their
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detention can be accounted for in this AR Model. If, however, a given suspected member
of a group like al-Qaeda--a suspected terrorist (“ST”)--does not fall under this last
category (or any of the former three categories), then he must be released and policed like
any criminal defendant who is acquitted at trial if he is not tried and convicted of a crime.
Alec Walen, Transcending, But Not Abandoning, the Combatant-Civilian Distinction: A Case Study, 63 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1149, 1163–64 (2011). In considering his point, Walen discusses the al-Marri case, in which the
Fourth Circuit’s holding was ultimately vacated as moot: al-Marri, a Qatari citizen arrested in December
2001 in connection to the 9/11 attacks, was criminally charged with possessing fraudulent credit card
numbers in 2002 and with making false statements to the FBI in 2003; pleading not guilty, al-Marri was
set for trial until President Bush determined that al-Marri was an enemy combatant associated with al
Qaeda and transferred to military detention in South Carolina. See al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220
(2009), vacating as moot Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 214, 219 (4th Cir. 2008), Al-Marri filed for habeas
relief and while the Fourth Circuit held that he could be detained as an enemy combatant, it also held that
he had not been provided with sufficient process to challenge that determination; the Supreme Court
granted certiorari but vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision when the Government opted to release alMarri from military detention and prosecute him in federal district court. See al-Marri, 555 U.S. at 1220.
Walen laments the Government’s dismissal, because the Court had never addressed a citizen or legal
resident alien being arrested and detained on U.S. soil, far from any battlefield:
The Court had already determined, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, that U.S. citizens can be held as
enemy combatants. But that case based its holding at least in part on the assumption (to
be verified by a fair hearing) that Hamdi was captured while fighting with the Taliban in
what was a traditional international armed conflict, a conflict in which the United States
was and remains actively engaged. This left the question whether a U.S. citizen or a
legally resident alien, who was not captured on a traditional battlefield and had not even
taken up arms against the United States on behalf of an enemy nation, could likewise be
detained as an enemy combatant.
Transcending, supra note 197, at 1153. Walen’s argument would that such a determination, made far from
the battlefield and in a context where civilian law enforcement was operating effectively and could
capably dispose of the issue, “threatens to strip the protections of the criminal law and its highly
protective due process framework from people who any civil libertarian would think deserve to benefit
from them.” Id. at 1159. In a similar vein, other scholars asserted that generational detention without
charge, under any justification, is inconsistent with American constitutional jurisprudence and
international human rights law. As early as 2002, one Canadian scholar considered the implications to
American constitutional law:
The Pentagon's top lawyer has gone further, to suggest that even terror suspects who are
tried and acquitted may be held in indefinite detention. A senior aide to former president
George Bush Sr. is worried: “Would I be comfortable keeping them in Guantanamo for 20
years on the theory that the war on terrorism is still going on? Probably not.” I would
remove the “probably”. No principle of international or American law can be invoked to
permit indefinite preventive detention.
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international legal basis for such detentions, one thing is certain: no humanitarian law
treaty provides express authority to detain captives based on this categorization. This
has led many critics of U.S. detention practices to condemn the legal rationale for
preventive detentions.
For purposes of U.S. practice, it is clear that the authority to detain unprivileged
enemy belligerents has been legally sanctioned by both the Supreme Court and
Congress (originally by implication and now expressly pursuant to the NDAA) as an
exercise of national war powers.193 It is equally clear, however, that this legal basis is
Stephen J. Toope, Fallout from ‘9-11’: Will a Secure Culture Undermine Human Rights?, 65 SASK. L. REV. 281,
289 (2002). In the ten years that have passed since 9/11, America and the world continue to struggle with
the legal effects of the GWOT and with the effect of detaining persons in an armed conflict that
transcends borders and traditional battlefields. While criticism began at the same time the original
detention plan was implemented, today the concerns seem to stem from the duality of looking back a
decade and looking into the future indefinitely. Critics of long-term detention also focus on the relative
inefficiency of trials by military commission—a handful charged and even fewer convicted and
sentenced—despite the immense public. A common theme in modern criticism is that
law of war detention is not an alternative to prosecution—the central focus of both POW
detention and civilian detention for security reasons under the Fourth Geneva
Convention is not criminal prosecution but protective and preventive detention.
Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV.
1169, 1189 (2011). Taken a step further, the argument against indefinite detention is becoming and will
remain that “suggest[ing] that the United States can either prosecute detainees or hold them in indefinite
detention is equivalent to suggesting that detention is another form of punishment.” Id. On another level,
even the federal courts most sympathetic to the Government’s national security concerns are critical of
the potential indefinite detention scheme. Considering generational detention at facilities in Afghanistan
and detainees’ inability to challenge such detention using habeas, judge John Bates wrote:
It is one thing to detain those captured on the surrounding battlefield at a place like
Bagram, which respondents correctly maintain is in a theater of war. It is quite another
thing to apprehend people in foreign countries—far from any Afghan battlefield—and
then bring them to a theater of war, where the Constitution arguably may not reach. Such
rendition resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive power the Supreme Court
sought to guard against in Boumediene—the concern that the Executive could move
detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitution and detain them indefinitely.
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 220 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
193

See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.L. 104-70, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001)

(authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . .
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
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most robust in relation to individuals designated as unprivileged belligerents as the
result of their participation in combat operations against U.S. or coalition military
forces.194 The definition of unprivileged belligerent (originally unlawful enemy
combatant) has, however, never been restricted to such individuals. Instead, from the
inception of the war on terror it has included individuals who associated with al Qaeda
or who provide support (qualified at various times as material or substantial) to
belligerent forces or to international terrorist groups. This expansive definition of a
detainable captive has undoubtedly contributed to the overall criticism leveled at the
United States.
Providing captives with assistance of counsel during their detention hearings
will obviously not impact the scope of asserted detention authority. However, assuming
counsel will enhance the quality of representation – an assumption at the core of this
article – it will mitigate the over-breadth inherent in the current definition of
unprivileged belligerents subject to preventive detention. Perhaps more importantly,
this mitigating effect will likely bear an inverse relationship to the perceived legitimacy
of the different categories of detainable unprivileged belligerent. Individuals captured
on what is best described as a traditional field of battle after having engaged in
hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces – the type of individual most analogous to a
traditional enemy prisoner of war and therefore most justifiably subjected to wartime
preventive detention195 – would be unlikely to garner much benefit from assistance of
organizations or persons”; by implication, “all necessary force” includes the detaining persons believed to
be planning or aiding in past or future terror attacks against the United States).
194

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004), In her plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor recognized that

both Hamdi and the Government
agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we have
discussed here [i.e. the right to challenge detention]; that process is due only when the
determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized.
Id.
195

See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (“Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as

prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and
detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which
render their belligerency unlawful”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518, 521 (2004) (holding that
detention of “individuals falling into the limited category [defined by the AUMF], for the duration of the
particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to
be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use” and
that “the United States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately
determined to be Taliban combatants.” So long as American forces are engaged in combat in Afghanistan,
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counsel. In contrast, captives alleged to be subject to preventive detention as the result
of a tenuous association with al Qaeda or for providing support to belligerent forces or
terrorist operations – the aspect of the unprivileged belligerent definition most
attenuated from the traditional enemy prisoner of war definition and therefore most
susceptible to criticism – would garner the most benefit from assistance of counsel. The
weight of evidence, credibility of witnesses and statements, and inferences derived
from circumstantial evidence is most critical in relation to these captives, all aspects of
the detention review process that implicate the core competency of effective legal
representation.196
The third potential benefit that would likely flow from provision of counsel to
captives facing preventive detention would be a more efficient culling of justified
versus unjustified detentions. Because this will serve the interests of captives and the
military, this benefit may in fact be the most significant. It is utterly false to assume that
the military benefits from an overly broad swath of detention authority. To the contrary,
detaining individuals without legitimate justification consumes limited resources
unnecessarily, detracts from the allocation of effort focused on individuals legitimately
subject to detention, alienates local populations, and undermines the overall credibility
of the detention operation. However, it is difficult to ignore the reality that soldiers at
the point of capture have an incentive to err on the side of caution and initially detain
individuals even when the justification is uncertain. At this point in the detention
process, soldiers lack the clarity of careful evidentiary assessments and lack the time
and space to consider the totality of the circumstances related to their decision. As a
result, the military itself has a strong interest in an efficient yet effective process to cull
from the group of captive subjected to long-term preventive detention individuals
whose initial detention is determined to have been unjustified (a consideration
obviously recognized by Congress when it exempted point-of-capture detention
decisions from the legal representation provision of the NDAA).
Enhancing the quality of the fact-finding and review process would contribute to
a more efficient allocation of detention resources and mitigate the very real risk of
unjustified detentions. Assuming provision of counsel for detainees would provide
the Court held that if the United States proves that the person was “’engaged in an armed conflict against
the United States’ . . . [the] detentions [would be] part of the exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ .
. . authorized by the AUMF”).
196

This consideration may justify a limited provision of counsel, triggered only when a captive is

subjected to detention for conduct that did not occur in the context of combat operations.

82

such an enhancement, the benefit of a more effective continued detention determination
would clearly be within the interest of U.S. forces. The more complex the status
determination, the more significant this benefit becomes. This provides a rational basis
to distinguish between a true GPW Article 5 tribunal process and detention review
proceedings related to unprivileged belligerents. As discussed above, determining those
captives who should be detained by virtue of their status as unprivileged belligerents in
the context of the war on terror is far more complex than analogous determinations in
the context of an armed conflict against a traditional state armed force. This provides a
logical explanation for why providing assistance of counsel for unprivileged
belligerents does not necessitate an analogous extension of this protection to suspected
POWs brought before an Article 5 tribunal.
All of these potential benefits are of course only one aspect of the decisionmaking equation. Any extension of legal representation for wartime detention
determination must account for the costs of such provision. These costs fall into three
broad categories. First, the resource allocation cost, or more specifically the burden
imposed on the military legal community to allocate the manpower to satisfy this
requirement. Second, the transaction cost produced by injecting legal representation for
detainees at status determination proceedings - the adversarial instincts of lawyers will
almost inevitably influence the nature of these proceedings, making them potentially
more cumbersome and complex. Finally, the precedential cost of providing counsel as a
matter of policy absent a clear legal obligation to do so. No matter how vigorously the
government emphasizes the gratuitous nature of such a policy (which should be a
central aspect of implementing the NDAA mandate), future detention operations would
almost certainly be impacted by a perceived need to replicate the policy, even in
situations without analogous justification. It is to these costs that this article will now
turn.
Part V: But is it Feasible?
Congress obviously concluded that none of these concerns justified the
continuation of the pure lay representative model. However, this does not render them
irrelevant. Instead, they will almost certainly influence the definition of the long-term
trigger, and should be at least considered in order to place this development into wider
strategic and operational context.
a. Added Complexity.
Making a review process more complex as a result of more effective
representation may be inevitable. However, this cost will be offset by the benefit of this
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complexity: improved accuracy. Accuracy is certainly the ultimate objective of any
detention review process, for it not only protects the individual captive from unjustified
deprivation of liberty, but also protects the detaining power from releasing captives
who should be subjected to continued detention. Compromising accuracy in the
interest of efficiency is simply not defensible, especially when the consequence of
erroneous decisions is as profound as that associated with the wartime preventive
detention process.
b. Precedential Impact?
The risk that providing legal representation to individuals subjected to wartime
preventive detention will be leveraged in future conflicts to press for extending this
protection to more traditional enemy captives is a much more significant concern. Since
the end of World War II, there has been a steady and increasing pressure to extend
human rights principles to the context of armed conflict.197 During this same period, it
has also become commonplace for U.S. (and other) armed forces to supplement with
197

See Geoffrey S, Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights

Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. 52, 57, 59–61 (2010) (attributing this pressure, in
part, to the decrease in long-term military operations in the increase of so-called “peace operations,”
referring specifically to
military operations that did not involve sustained armed hostilities and therefore were
almost universally considered as failing outside the LOAC regulatory framework. One
aspect of these operations was that while participating armed forces were always
prepared to engage in combat like hostilities, use of force was normally restricted to
response to actual or imminent threat. As a result, the operational legal focus tended
more towards issues related to interacting with and treatment of the local civilian
population than with the application of combat power in a manner analogous to such
application during armed conflict.
Id. at 60 (citations omitted). Other law of war scholars have observed that
[f]rom an empirical perspective . . . there has been a convergence between the
international humanitarian law detention review standards and processes that one
would find in international armed conflict, and the human rights-oriented detention
review standards and processes that one would find in domestic or even international
criminal law proceedings. This convergence has been incremental, and responsive in
large part to international politics and litigation in U.S. courts. This convergence is more
than a question of politics and judicial decisions on the reach of executive power – treaty
and customary international law provide little detail as to what the standards and
processes for detention review are, and therefore allow states a significant degree of
latitude in fashioning their own measures.
Prescott, supra note 98, at 17.
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policy the range of individual protections required by law during military operations.
The combination of these two factors – the ever increasing emphasis on protecting
individual human rights during military operations and the practice of implementing
protections often not required by law – has rendered the line between law and policy
increasingly blurred.
Military practitioners are cognizant of this risk, and as a result it is almost
inevitable that it will influence assessments of the wisdom of adopting gratuitous
human rights protections during armed conflict. However, this risk does not
sufficiently offset the potential benefits of providing legal representation as a matter of
policy. Instead, it necessitates a clear and constant emphasis that it is indeed policy,
and not a sense of legal obligation, motivating this modification to the existing practice.
Unfortunately, Congress does not seem to have been cognizant of the importance
of this emphasis. The NDAA legal representation provision in no way indicates
whether it was adopted as a matter of national policy or in order to satisfy a perceived
international legal obligation. Indeed, the precedential impact of this provision of the
NDAA is almost certainly more uncertain because it took the form of a statute and not a
Department of Defense policy. Because of this, any implementing regulations should
emphasize the gratuitous nature of this provision, and that it does not indicate the U.S.
considers legal representation an international legal requirement.
c. Resource Drain?
Another significant consideration related to providing legal representation
during the preventive detention process is personnel impact on the military legal
community. Military lawyers, or JAGs, are a finite resource in any operational context.
Furthermore, the emphasis on rule of law and legally compliant operations has
imposed a greater demand on these lawyers today than ever before, a burden that will
almost certainly become even more demanding in the future. As a result, imposing an
additional requirement on this finite pool of lawyers should not be done casually.
Because detainee representation duties are not currently assigned to JAGs, it is
impossible to dispute the fact that this change in policy will impose a significant new
responsibility on these military lawyers. However, this responsibility will provide a
valuable opportunity for these lawyers to engage in a function that hones core advocacy
and operational competencies. It may also be logical to leverage the already existing
military trial defense services to assume this duty, perhaps with augmentation from
reserve component activated on a rotational basis to represent detainees. Like all
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missions in the military, once it is prioritized there is simply no question it will be
effectively accomplished.
Conclusion
Indefinite preventive detention is an inevitable necessity of armed hostilities.
Some see this as unfortunate, others as mission essential, and still others as wholly
illegitimate. These reactions, while understandable, simply do not diminish the reality
that preventive detention will be a continued aspect of the U.S. struggle against
international terrorism. Like all wars before and those to come in the future, preventing
captured belligerent operatives from returning to the fight is logical and necessary to
achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success.
There is, however, another aspect of this preventive detention process that is
equally undeniable: the unconventional nature of the struggle against terrorism and the
operatives that form the ranks of this enemy. This reality creates a risk of erroneous
detention and unjustified long-term deprivation of liberty that is exponentially more
significant than the risk associated with conventional or ‘traditional’ armed conflicts.
This endangers not only the liberty interest of innocent individuals erroneously
suspected of being agents of terrorists groups, but also the strategic interests of the
United States by eroding the precious perception of legitimacy.
Providing legal representation to individuals brought before administrative
detention review proceedings is an important aspect of mitigating this risk. No process
can guarantee 100% accuracy in the outcomes of these proceedings; however, providing
extensive process without representatives devoted to the ethos of zealous
representation seems remarkably hollow. As American law students learn through the
Sixth Amending jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it is the zealous devotion to the
client that effectuates the process erected to protect individuals from government
accusation.
The recent inclusion of a military legal representation provision in the NDAA is
an important development in this area. While it is unclear why Congress included this
provision, it nonetheless reflects a judgment that the current lay-representation
approach derived from the Prisoner of War Convention Article 5 Tribunal process is
insufficient to address the interests of war on terror detainees. How this provision will
be implemented is yet to be seen, but perhaps the Department of Defense should
embrace the logic of entrusting lawyers with this responsibility early in the detention
review process. While the gratuitous nature of this protection should absolutely be
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emphasized, the potential benefits that will flow from this change sufficiently outweigh
the costs sufficiently and warrant abandoning the current approach.
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